AI network token
Audiera BEAT
Audiera (BEAT) is a standard BEP-20 token on BNB Smart Chain with no custom cryptographic implementations. Per QRI Section 7.2, it inherits the base-layer QRI posture of BNB Chain. As of June 2026, BNB Chain mainnet relies entirely on classical ECDSA (secp256k1) for transaction signatures and BLS12-381 for validator consensus — both quantum-vulnerable. BNB Chain has published a research report (May 2026) and produced a closed draft prototype (GitHub PR #3660, April–May 2026) exploring migration to ML-DSA-44 and pqSTARK, but no testnet or mainnet deployment exists. The prototype confirms 40% throughput reduction under PQ load. BEAT's ~$503M market cap (~288M circulating supply) is fully exposed to quantum key-recovery attacks on both user EOAs and token admin/owner keys. QRI Score = 14 (Stage 1, Factor Score 14.42, capped at 20 by Stage 1 cap, binding minimum = 14).
Inherits L1 Score: BNB ChainRoadmap OnlyClassical ECC Only
Category breakdown
QRI Factors
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
6.39 / 20
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
0.75 / 15
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
1.5 / 25
Production Cryptographic Protection
3.28 / 35
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
2.5 / 5
Critical Quantum Blockers
- Active production spend authorization on BNB Chain mainnet remains entirely ECDSA (secp256k1) — quantum-vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. All BEAT token transfers, approvals, and interactions are secured only by classical ECC.
- BEAT token admin/owner keys secured by BNB Chain classical ECC. Quantum-enabled key recovery of the owner address would allow unauthorized ownership transfer, potentially enabling token minting, freezing, or other administrative actions.
- BNB Chain consensus validator signatures remain BLS12-381 — quantum-vulnerable. A quantum compromise of BSC consensus could enable chain reorganization affecting all tokens including BEAT.
- No production PQ or hybrid-PQ protection deployed on BNB Chain mainnet. BNB Chain's PQ work remains at the research-report and closed-draft-prototype stage with no testnet or mainnet deployment timeline.
Key Risks
- All BEAT token transfers, approvals, and holdings are secured exclusively by BNB Chain's ECDSA (secp256k1) signatures. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could recover private keys from publicly exposed public keys, enabling theft of all BEAT held in transacted EOAs and long-exposure addresses.
- BEAT token contract owner address (Ownable pattern) is secured by classical ECC. Quantum compromise would allow the attacker to call transferOwnership() and gain full administrative control over the token contract — potentially enabling minting, burning, pausing, or freezing of user funds.
- BNB Chain's BLS12-381 validator signatures are permanently stored on-chain, enabling harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. A future quantum adversary could retroactively forge validator attestations, potentially compromising consensus finality for historical blocks.
- The BNB Chain PQ migration research is explicitly described as 'research and evaluation, not a response to any immediate security threat.' No testnet fork, mainnet activation date, or production deployment commitment exists. The 40% throughput penalty documented in bench tests indicates significant engineering challenges remain.
- No Audiera-specific quantum risk assessment, cryptographic inventory, migration plan, or incident-response process has been published. The project's quantum readiness depends entirely on BNB Chain's L1 migration trajectory, over which Audiera has no direct control.
Assurance Notes
- CertiK Skynet audit exists for the BEAT BEP-20 smart contract (current for token-scope, scope-mismatched for quantum-critical review). The audit covers standard smart-contract security but does not assess post-quantum cryptographic properties.
- BNB Chain's PQ prototype (GitHub PR #3660) has no independent cryptographic audit. The PR was a closed draft that was never merged or deployed.
- No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook, emergency disclosure process, or quantum threat model published by the Audiera project itself. BNB Chain's research report provides partial coverage at the L1 level.
- No exchange or custody migration attestations exist for BEAT. This is expected given no PQ path exists on BNB Chain mainnet, but it means the entire ~$503M market cap remains secured by classical ECC.
- Performance benchmarks in the BNB Chain research report show a 40% throughput reduction under PQ load, indicating significant engineering work remains before any production deployment is viable.
- BEAT token contract uses standard Ownable pattern. The owner address can transfer ownership via a single ECC-secured transaction. Quantum compromise of the owner key would enable unauthorized administrative actions.
Non-Scoring Caveats
- CertiK Skynet audit is scope-mismatched for quantum-critical review — it evaluates standard smart-contract security, not post-quantum cryptographic assurance. This affects Confidence and Assurance Notes, not the QRI Score.
- BNB Chain research report explicitly states P2P handshakes and KZG commitments remain out of scope for the current PQ research phase. These are not currently deployed on BSC mainnet (KZG is not used in BSC consensus) so they do not create a new quantum-vulnerable path.
- No evidence of Audiera-specific cross-chain bridges introducing quantum vulnerabilities beyond BNB Chain base-layer inheritance.
- BNB Chain's PQ prototype (PR #3660) uses the cloudflare/circl ML-DSA-44 implementation. While this is a well-known library, no independent audit of the prototype integration exists.
- Future PQ-to-PQ upgrade uncertainty for BNB Chain is not scored — the current production system has no PQ protection at all, so future upgrade risk does not affect the current quantum-attack surface.
Evidence record
Claims and Caveats
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public cryptographic inventory and quantum threat model
Claim: BNB Chain research report (May 2026) identifies ECDSA (secp256k1) transaction signatures and BLS12-381 validator vote signatures as quantum-vulnerable critical mechanisms.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1 research; Audiera has published no independent inventory.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: BNB Chain research report is a primary source directly from bnbchain.org. The report identifies critical vulnerable mechanisms but is explicitly labeled as research/evaluation, not a production readiness assessment.
Credit assigned for BNB Chain's work per QRI 7.2 token inheritance. Score 0.50 reflects prototype-level identification with actual code, not just a proposal.
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public evidence record supporting assessment
Claim: BNB Chain has published a detailed migration research report with performance benchmarks, a GitHub PR (#3660) with 4,805 lines of prototype code implementing ML-DSA-44 and pqSTARK.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1 research artifacts.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The GitHub PR is a closed draft with 14 commits, 58 changed files. Code is publicly viewable and represents a substantive prototype. However, it was never merged, never deployed to testnet, and has no independent review.
Score 0.50 reflects prototype-level code evidence plus published research report with reproducible test data.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Spend authorization / transaction signatures
Claim: BEAT is a standard BEP-20 token on BNB Chain. All token transfers, approvals, and interactions rely on BNB Chain's ECDSA (secp256k1) transaction signatures.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1; token has no custom spend authorization.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Active production spend authorization on BNB Chain mainnet remains entirely ECDSA (secp256k1) — quantum-vulnerable.
Assurance: High confidence: BSC mainnet block explorer confirms ECDSA-based transactions.
BNB Chain's PQTxType (0x05) with ML-DSA-44 exists only in the closed draft PR #3660. It has never been deployed to BSC testnet or mainnet.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Account, address, public-key exposure, and key-derivation design
Claim: BEAT token holders use standard BSC EOAs. Public keys are exposed on-chain for all addresses that have sent transactions.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain; BEAT adds no custom account or key-derivation layer.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Long-exposure public keys in transacted BSC EOAs and BEAT token holders are permanently visible on-chain.
Assurance: High confidence: standard BSC account model is well-documented.
BSC address format remains 20-byte keccak256 hash — quantum-safe for address derivation, but does not protect against quantum key recovery once the public key is exposed.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Consensus-critical authentication (validator signatures, VRFs, threshold signatures, block certificates)
Claim: BNB Chain consensus (Parlia PoSA) uses BLS12-381 for fast-finality vote signatures. BLS12-381 is broken by Shor's algorithm on a quantum computer.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1 consensus layer.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: BNB Chain validator BLS12-381 signatures are permanently on-chain and quantum-vulnerable.
Assurance: High confidence: BLS12-381 usage in Parlia consensus is documented in the BSC codebase.
While BEAT as a token does not directly participate in consensus, a quantum compromise of BSC finality could enable double-spend attacks affecting all BSC-hosted assets including BEAT.
Production Cryptographic Protection
State-integrity and data-availability mechanisms
Claim: BNB Chain uses standard Ethereum-compatible Merkle Patricia Trie with Keccak-256 for state commitment. Keccak-256 provides ~128-bit post-quantum security against Grover's algorithm.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain; BEAT token balances are stored in standard contract storage within the MPT.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: Medium confidence: hash-based Merkle Patricia Trie design is inherently quantum-safe at ~128-bit security.
Score 0.50 reflects that Keccak-256 in Merkle tree construction is quantum-safe by cryptographic design.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Privacy and proof layers
Claim: BEAT is a standard BEP-20 token with no privacy features, ZK proofs, shielded transactions, note encryption, viewing keys, or stealth addresses.
Coverage basis: Token has no privacy layer.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Marked N/A per QRI applicability rules: the token protocol genuinely lacks this architectural layer.
Production Cryptographic Protection
P2P transport, node identity, and peer authentication
Claim: BNB Chain uses devp2p for node communication with classical cryptographic handshakes. The BNB Chain research report explicitly states P2P handshakes remain out of scope.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1 P2P layer.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: P2P quantum vulnerability is a lower-severity concern for a token holder.
Scored 0.00 because BNB Chain P2P transport remains classical.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Critical wallet, custody, HSM, and hardware-wallet workflows
Claim: No PQ wallet, custody, or HSM support exists for BNB Chain or BEAT. Standard BSC wallets use ECDSA key derivation and signing exclusively.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain ecosystem; BEAT has no custom wallet infrastructure.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: High confidence: standard BSC wallet ecosystem is well-documented as ECDSA-only.
This subfactor cannot be satisfied until BNB Chain deploys a PQ transaction path.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Percentage of economically relevant value-at-risk protected
Claim: BEAT has ~$503M market cap (~288M circulating supply, 1B total supply) on BNB Chain. 0% of this value is protected by PQ or hybrid-PQ mechanisms.
Coverage basis: Token value-at-risk on BNB Chain; no migration or protection exists.
Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: ~$503M in BEAT market cap (288M circulating tokens) with 0% PQ protection.
Assurance: Market data from CoinMarketCap (June 2026). Coverage is verifiably <25% since no PQ path exists on BNB Chain mainnet.
Per QRI 9.3.1 coverage thresholds: <25% coverage → score 1 of 20. Implementation Score = 1/20 = 0.05.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Critical wallets migrated, protected, or inherently PQ-native
Claim: No BEAT treasuries, exchange wallets, custody wallets, bridges, foundation wallets, or major protocol-controlled assets are PQ-protected.
Coverage basis: Token-specific admin and ecosystem wallets.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: BEAT token owner address secured by classical ECC.
Assurance: CertiK Skynet confirms the project has an audited smart contract with administrative control paths.
Zero critical wallets migrated because no PQ migration path exists on BNB Chain.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Legacy vulnerable pools/accounts/UTXOs/contracts identified, measurable, deprecated, migrated, frozen, or proven not to exist by design
Claim: BNB Chain research report identifies ECDSA and BLS as vulnerable mechanisms. The PQ prototype includes a PQ Registry (0x70) design for key migration.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain research; BEAT has no independent vulnerable-pool identification.
Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: BNB Chain research report identifies vulnerable cryptographic primitives but no on-chain measurement of vulnerable BEAT pools has occurred.
Score 0.25 reflects that vulnerable cryptographic mechanisms have been identified in BNB Chain's research report.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Public migration or protection roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, and dependencies
Claim: BNB Chain has published a research report exploring PQ migration with technical details. No production timeline or activation criteria exist.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain L1 research roadmap.
Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The research report is explicitly 'research and evaluation, not a response to any immediate security threat.'
Score 0.25 reflects a published research report with technical depth.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration accessibility and defaults
Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist for BEAT or BNB Chain in production.
Coverage basis: Token and host-chain migration tooling.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No PQ account creation, wallet tooling, or transaction paths exist for BEAT holders on BNB Chain mainnet.
Assurance: High confidence: BSC mainnet has no PQ transaction type deployed.
Zero accessibility because the underlying chain has no PQ path.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration enforcement and coordination
Claim: No enforcement mechanisms exist for BEAT or BNB Chain: no deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, or mandatory migration deadlines.
Coverage basis: Token and ecosystem coordination.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: BNB Chain has no PQ migration enforcement design beyond the research report's technical proposals.
Zero enforcement because the chain has no PQ path and no migration has been initiated.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process for quantum-related vulnerabilities
Claim: No quantum-specific incident-response playbook, emergency disclosure process, or governance process has been published by Audiera or BNB Chain for quantum-related vulnerabilities.
Coverage basis: Token and host-chain governance.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: No quantum-specific incident-response process has been published. Per QRI Section 8.2: 'No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook' does not create a Readiness & Risk Cap by itself.
Treated as note-only per QRI 7.4 (Note-Only Caveat Rule).
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Uses NIST-standardized, standards-track, or broadly reviewed PQC/hybrid-PQC algorithms
Claim: BNB Chain's PQ prototype uses ML-DSA-44 (NIST FIPS 204, standardized August 2024) for transaction signatures and pqSTARK for consensus vote aggregation.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain PQ prototype; no Audiera-specific algorithm work.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: ML-DSA-44 is a NIST FIPS 204 standardized algorithm. However, the BNB Chain prototype integration has no independent audit.
Score 0.50 reflects prototype-level implementation of NIST-standardized algorithms.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Independent cryptographic and implementation audit for quantum-critical scope
Claim: No independent cryptographic audit exists for BNB Chain's PQ prototype implementation. The CertiK audit for BEAT covers standard smart-contract security, not post-quantum cryptography.
Coverage basis: No PQ audit exists at any layer.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: The BNB Chain PQ prototype has no independent audit. The CertiK audit is scope-mismatched.
Score 0.00 because no PQ implementation is in production to audit.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Open-source, reproducible implementation
Claim: BNB Chain's PQ prototype (PR #3660) is open source under LGPL-3.0. The code is publicly viewable on GitHub with 58 changed files and 4,805 additions.
Coverage basis: BNB Chain PQ prototype code.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The code is publicly viewable but the PR is a closed draft. It was never merged into the develop branch.
Score 0.50 reflects open-source code at prototype level.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Parameter agility and future upgrade path
Claim: BNB Chain research report discusses parameter trade-offs between ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87. The PQ prototype uses an IsPQFork gate suggesting a hard-fork activation model.
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain research and prototype design.
Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The research report documents the rationale for choosing ML-DSA-44 over higher-security variants.
Score 0.25 reflects documented parameter trade-offs in the research report.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Stateful-signature safety (XMSS/LMS-style concerns)
Claim: ML-DSA-44 (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) is a stateless Fiat-Shamir-based signature scheme. It does not require state management.
Coverage basis: Algorithm property; ML-DSA-44 is stateless by design.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: ML-DSA-44 is well-documented as a stateless scheme in NIST FIPS 204.
Marked N/A because the algorithm choice (ML-DSA-44) does not have stateful-signature safety concerns.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Performance and resource-impact analysis
Claim: BNB Chain research report includes detailed performance benchmarks: transaction size increase from 110B to ~2.5KB, block size from ~130KB to ~2MB, native transfer TPS drop from 4,973 to 2,997 (40% reduction).
Coverage basis: Inherited from BNB Chain research report performance analysis.
Implementation score: 0.75 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: Performance analysis is thorough and includes cross-region testing, mixed workload analysis, and finality latency measurements.
Score 0.75 reflects comprehensive performance analysis with detailed metrics.
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