Pre-release notice:
The Quantum Readiness Index is still being reviewed and refined. Reports may include rough edges, including incomplete and/or incorrect coverage.

meme token

币安人生 (BinanceLife) 币安人生

币安人生 (BinanceLife) is a standard, immutable BEP-20 meme token on BNB Smart Chain with renounced ownership and no custom cryptography. Under QRI Section 7.2 (Token Inheritance), it inherits the base-layer QRI score of BNB Smart Chain. As of 2026-06-01, BSC production relies entirely on classical ECDSA for spend authorization and BLS12-381 for consensus, leaving 100% of the token's ~$632M market cap exposed to quantum key-recovery attacks. BNB Chain published a post-quantum cryptography migration research report on May 14, 2026, evaluating ML-DSA-44 transaction signatures and pqSTARK consensus aggregation with detailed benchmarks, but this remains a research/proof-of-concept document with no public testnet, committed timeline, or mainnet deployment. The token itself has no agency to migrate; its quantum readiness is entirely dependent on BSC's future host-chain upgrade. Token-specific admin keys are satisfied by design (ownership renounced, no proxy, no minting).

Roadmap OnlyInherits L1 Score (BNB Smart Chain)
Stage 2
Confidence Medium
Urgency [Migration Required]
Review Status Draft
Evaluated 2026-06-01
Scope Standard BEP-20 meme token inheriting BNB Smart Chain host-layer cryptography; token-specific admin/governance keys only
AI-generated report. This report was produced by the evaluator and synthesis pipeline. Review status: draft.

Category breakdown

QRI Factors

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance 2.78 / 20
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination 0.75 / 15
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk 0 / 25
Production Cryptographic Protection 0 / 35
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness 1.25 / 5

Critical Quantum Blockers

  • Active production spend authorization on BNB Smart Chain remains entirely ECDSA (secp256k1) with no mainnet or public testnet PQC deployment as of 2026-06-01.
  • 100% of token value-at-risk (~$632M market cap) is exposed to quantum key-recovery attacks via host chain ECC vulnerability; no migration, freeze, deprecation, or recovery path exists.
  • Consensus-critical authentication on BSC remains BLS12-381 only; pqSTARK aggregation exists only in a research report with no production or testnet deployment.

Key Risks

  • 100% of token value (~$632M market cap) is exposed to quantum key-recovery attacks via BSC's ECDSA-based spend authorization.
  • BSC's PQ migration is at research/prototype stage only (May 2026 report); no public testnet, committed timeline, or mainnet deployment exists.
  • All BSC addresses with exposed public keys (transacted EOAs, reused addresses) represent long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value with no migration or deprecation path.
  • BSC consensus remains BLS12-381 only; validator authentication is quantum-vulnerable.
  • Token is immutable with renounced ownership; it cannot independently upgrade or migrate to a PQ-secure host chain.
  • BSC's proposed PQ migration path explicitly excludes P2P handshakes and KZG commitments, leaving structural vulnerabilities even in the proposed design.

Assurance Notes

  • Token is a standard immutable BEP-20 on BNB Smart Chain with renounced ownership; no token-specific admin keys exist to evaluate.
  • Host chain (BNB Smart Chain) published a post-quantum cryptography migration research report on May 14, 2026, evaluating ML-DSA-44 transaction signatures and pqSTARK consensus aggregation. This is a research/proof-of-concept document with benchmarks, not a testnet or mainnet deployment.
  • No independent audit of any PQ implementation exists for BSC or this token. The BSC report is a research document, not an audited specification.
  • Token contract automated audits (CertiK Skynet, ApeSpace) confirm renounced ownership, no proxy, no minting, no blacklist. These are classical smart-contract audits, not PQ-relevant.
  • BSC's PQ research report identifies P2P handshakes and KZG commitments as out of scope, meaning even the proposed migration path is incomplete.
  • No public testnet, committed roadmap timeline, or activation criteria for BSC's PQ migration have been published as of the evaluation date.

Non-Scoring Caveats

  • BNB Chain published a detailed PQ migration research report on May 14, 2026, with ML-DSA-44 and pqSTARK benchmarks. This is prototype/research-level work, not production protection.
  • Token ownership is renounced (zero address), eliminating token-level admin key quantum vulnerability.
  • Token contract is immutable (no proxy, no minting), so no future token-level upgrade path exists regardless of PQ status.
  • Market cap of ~$632M represents significant value-at-risk fully exposed to host chain ECC vulnerability.
  • BSC's PQ research report explicitly excludes P2P handshakes and KZG commitments from scope, indicating the proposed migration path itself is incomplete.
  • BSC's PQ research reports 40-50% throughput reduction under PQC testing, indicating significant scalability challenges before any production deployment.

Evidence record

Claims and Caveats

Token Inheritance

Host chain dependency

Claim: 币安人生 is a standard BEP-20 token on BNB Smart Chain with no custom cryptography; inherits BSC's cryptographic properties.

Coverage basis: Non-native dependency on BNB Smart Chain

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Contract address verified on BscScan. Standard BEP-20 confirmed by multiple sources.

Token inherits BSC QRI score per Section 7.2. Only token-specific admin/governance keys require separate evaluation.

Token Governance

Token-specific admin/governance keys

Claim: Token contract ownership is renounced (zero address); no proxy, no minting, no blacklist functions exist.

Coverage basis: Satisfied by design - no admin keys exist

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Verified by CertiK Skynet and ApeSpace automated audit. Owner address confirmed as 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000.

Eliminates token-level admin key quantum vulnerability. Token is immutable and cannot be upgraded.

Transaction

Spend authorization / transaction signatures

Claim: BNB Smart Chain uses ECDSA (secp256k1) for all transaction signatures in production. BSC published a research report on May 14, 2026, proposing migration to ML-DSA-44, but no testnet or mainnet deployment exists.

Coverage basis: Classical ECC-only in production; PQ exists only in research report

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Active production spend authorization on BNB Smart Chain remains entirely ECDSA-based with no mainnet or public testnet PQC deployment.

Assurance: BSC research report (May 2026) confirms current production uses ECDSA. ML-DSA-44 migration is proposed but not deployed. Report is research/prototype only.

BSC's May 2026 report shows ML-DSA-44 signatures increase transaction size from 110B to ~2.5KB and reduce throughput by ~40%. This is benchmark data from internal testing, not a public testnet or mainnet deployment.

Transaction

Account, address, public-key exposure, and key-derivation design

Claim: BSC uses standard 20-byte Ethereum-style addresses derived from ECDSA public keys. Public keys are exposed on-chain for all transacted accounts (long-exposure risk). No PQ account types or key-derivation controls exist.

Coverage basis: Classical ECC-only

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BSC report confirms address format remains 20 bytes derived from public key via keccak-256, even under proposed ML-DSA-44 migration. All transacted EOAs have exposed public keys.

Long-exposure quantum risk for all BSC accounts that have sent transactions (public keys visible on-chain). BSC's proposed migration keeps the same address format, meaning existing exposed-key accounts remain vulnerable unless a separate migration mechanism is introduced.

Consensus

Consensus-critical authentication (validator signatures, VRFs, block certificates)

Claim: BSC uses BLS12-381 for validator signature aggregation in production. BSC's May 2026 research report proposes pqSTARK aggregation (43:1 compression ratio), but this is not deployed on testnet or mainnet.

Coverage basis: Classical BLS-only in production

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Consensus-critical authentication on BSC remains BLS12-381 only; pqSTARK exists only in research report.

Assurance: BSC report shows pqSTARK compresses 6 validator signatures (14.5 KB) into ~340 bytes. This is test/benchmark data only.

BLS12-381 is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. pqSTARK aggregation shows promise in benchmarks but is not deployed.

State Integrity

State-integrity and data-availability mechanisms

Claim: BSC uses standard EVM state trie with no PQ-specific commitments or state-binding mechanisms. KZG commitments are explicitly out of scope in BSC's PQ research report.

Coverage basis: Classical only

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BSC report explicitly states KZG commitments remain out of scope for the PQ migration proposal.

Even BSC's proposed PQ migration path does not address KZG commitments or other state-binding mechanisms.

Privacy

Privacy and proof layers

Claim: BNB Smart Chain has no native privacy layer, shielded pools, or ZK proof systems for user transactions.

Coverage basis: Not applicable

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Privacy subfactor is N/A for BSC and all tokens inheriting its security model.

P2P

P2P transport, node identity, and peer authentication

Claim: BSC uses classical P2P networking. BSC's PQ research report explicitly states P2P handshakes remain out of scope.

Coverage basis: Classical only

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: operational/product caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BSC report explicitly excludes P2P handshakes from PQ migration scope.

P2P identity is not consensus, spend, bridge, or custody-critical for this token, but remains a host-chain vulnerability.

Wallet/Custody

Critical wallet, custody, HSM, signer workflows

Claim: No PQ or hybrid-PQ wallet, custody, or HSM support exists for BSC transactions. All BSC wallets use standard ECDSA signing.

Coverage basis: Classical only

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No evidence of any PQ-capable wallet or custody solution for BSC.

All BSC wallets and custody providers rely on ECDSA signing, consistent with the host chain's production cryptography.

Migration

Percentage of value-at-risk protected

Claim: 0% of token value-at-risk is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. The entire ~$632M market cap is exposed via BSC's ECDSA-based spend authorization.

Coverage basis: No PQ protection exists

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: cap-applying

Quantum blocker: 100% of token value (~$632M market cap) is exposed to quantum key-recovery attacks with no migration, freeze, deprecation, or recovery path.

Assurance: Market cap figure from CoinMarketCap as of June 2026. All value is on BSC which uses ECDSA.

Coverage is 0%. Per Section 9.3.1, <25% coverage scores 1 point, but 0% protection with no migration path scores 0.

Migration

Critical wallets migrated or protected

Claim: No critical wallets (exchanges, custodians, treasuries) have migrated to PQ controls on BSC. No PQ account types exist on BSC.

Coverage basis: No migration exists

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No PQ migration of any kind exists on BSC.

Token ownership is renounced, so no token-level treasury or admin wallet exists. But all holder wallets on BSC remain ECC-vulnerable.

Migration

Legacy vulnerable pools identified and addressed

Claim: No mechanism exists on BSC to identify, deprecate, freeze, or migrate legacy quantum-vulnerable accounts. No policy for unmigratable vulnerable value.

Coverage basis: No mechanism exists

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

BSC has no announced policy for handling unmigratable quantum-vulnerable value (lost keys, dormant accounts, etc.).

Governance

Public migration roadmap with sequencing and activation criteria

Claim: BNB Chain published a PQ migration research report on May 14, 2026, with technical evaluation of ML-DSA-44 and pqSTARK. However, this is a research document, not a committed roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, or deployment timeline.

Coverage basis: Research report / proposal only

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Report is described as 'research and evaluation, rather than a response to any immediate security threat' by BNB Chain. No committed timeline or activation criteria.

The report is a public proposal/research document. It scores 0.25 (public design/proposal) per the Implementation Score table. No testnet or mainnet deployment exists.

Governance

Migration accessibility and defaults

Claim: No PQ account creation, wallet tooling, migration prompts, or user-facing PQ migration paths exist on BSC.

Coverage basis: Nothing available

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

No PQ migration tooling of any kind exists for BSC users or token holders.

Governance

Migration enforcement and coordination

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms, deprecation timelines, unsafe-path blocking, or exchange/custody coordination for PQ migration exists on BSC.

Coverage basis: Nothing available

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

No exchange attestations, custody migration plans, or enforcement mechanisms for PQ migration on BSC.

Governance

Emergency disclosure / incident-response for quantum vulnerabilities

Claim: No quantum-specific incident-response process, emergency governance, or disclosure mechanism exists for BSC or this token.

Coverage basis: Nothing available

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: Per QRI v3.1, lack of a formal quantum-specific IR playbook is an assurance-only caveat unless it leaves a current quantum-vulnerable path unresolved.

Token has renounced ownership and no governance mechanism. BSC has no published quantum-specific IR process.

Algorithm

Uses NIST-standardized or broadly reviewed PQC algorithms

Claim: BSC's research report proposes ML-DSA-44 (NIST FIPS 204, August 2024) for transaction signatures and pqSTARK for consensus aggregation. These are well-reviewed standards, but only exist in a research proposal for BSC.

Coverage basis: Proposal only

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: ML-DSA-44 is NIST FIPS 204 standardized. pqSTARK is a well-reviewed hash-based proof system. Both are appropriate choices, but only exist in a research document for BSC.

Algorithm selection is sound (NIST-standardized ML-DSA-44 at Level 2 security). Score reflects proposal-only status.

Algorithm

Independent cryptographic and implementation audit

Claim: No independent audit of any PQ implementation exists for BSC or this token. The BSC PQ research report has not been independently audited.

Coverage basis: No audit exists

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: Per QRI v3.1, lack of audit for a proposal-stage design is an assurance-only caveat unless it makes a quantum-critical property unverifiable. Since no PQ is deployed, there is nothing to audit.

No PQ implementation exists in production or testnet, so no audit is expected at this stage.

Algorithm

Open-source, reproducible implementation

Claim: No public open-source PQ implementation code exists for BSC. The research report is published but the underlying test code is not confirmed as open-source.

Coverage basis: No public code

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BSC research report is publicly available but implementation code status is unclear.

No public PQ code repository identified for BSC.

Algorithm

Parameter agility and future upgrade path

Claim: BSC's research report discusses ML-DSA-44 vs higher security variants (ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87) and the throughput trade-offs. This shows parameter awareness at the proposal stage.

Coverage basis: Proposal-level documentation

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Report discusses why ML-DSA-44 was chosen over higher variants (signature size impact on throughput). This is proposal-level parameter documentation.

Algorithm

Stateful-signature safety and side-channel considerations

Claim: ML-DSA-44 is a stateless lattice-based signature scheme; stateful-signature safety (XMSS/LMS-style anti-reuse controls) is not applicable. Side-channel and HSM considerations for PQ are not addressed in the BSC report.

Coverage basis: Not applicable for ML-DSA

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

N/A because ML-DSA is stateless and no PQ implementation exists to evaluate for side-channel risks.

Algorithm

Performance and resource-impact analysis

Claim: BSC's May 2026 research report includes detailed performance benchmarks: TPS drop from 4,973 to 2,997 (~40%), block size increase from 130KB to ~2MB, signature size from 65B to 2,420B, and P99 finality latency increase to 11 slots.

Coverage basis: Prototype/test-level analysis

Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Performance analysis is from internal testing published in May 2026 report. Not independently verified but detailed and specific.

BSC's performance analysis is thorough and identifies the primary bottleneck as data size growth rather than verification performance. Score 0.50 reflects prototype/testnet-level analysis.

Report metadata

Generation Details