blockchain network

NEAR Protocol NEAR

NEAR Protocol activated mainnet upgrade 2.13 on July 20, 2026, adding NIST-standardized FIPS-204 (ML-DSA-65) as an optional third signature scheme for account spend authorization alongside Ed25519 and secp256k1. NEAR's decoupled account model—human-readable account IDs with rotatable access keys—is a genuine structural advantage that enables single-transaction key rotation without address migration. However, as of the evaluation date (2026-07-25, ~5 days post-upgrade), migration coverage is effectively zero, default signing remains Ed25519 (quantum-vulnerable), users can still create new classical-only accounts by default, and no enforcement or deprecation mechanism exists for unmigrated keys. Critically, consensus/validator authentication remains Ed25519-only with no PQ path, and the Chain Signatures MPC cross-chain infrastructure (serving 35+ chains) uses classical threshold cryptography with post-quantum MPC still in research. No independent audit of the ML-DSA implementation has been identified. The QRI Score of 43 reflects optional mainnet PQ spend authorization (Stage 3: Migration Live) capped at 70 by vulnerable consensus and further constrained by near-zero migration coverage, absent consensus protection, and unverified implementation assurance.

Partial ProtectionMigration Live
Stage Migration Live
Confidence Medium
Urgency [Migration Required]
Review Status Draft
Evaluated 2026-07-25
Scope Native asset (NEAR) on NEAR Protocol mainnet, protocol version 86 (upgrade 2.13), including base-layer accounts, consensus, P2P, and Chain Signatures MPC cross-chain infrastructure
AI-generated report. This report was produced by the evaluator and synthesis pipeline. Review status: draft.

Category breakdown

QRI Factors

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance 13.5 / 20
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination 3.75 / 15
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk 2 / 25
Production Cryptographic Protection 18.5 / 35
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness 5 / 5

Critical Quantum Blockers

  • Consensus/validator authentication remains Ed25519-only: validator endorsement and skip messages are signed with Ed25519, making finality and block production vulnerable to quantum forgery attacks (cap 70).
  • Chain Signatures MPC network uses classical threshold ECDSA/EdDSA for cross-chain signing across 35+ chains; post-quantum MPC remains in research stage with no production timeline (cap 70).
  • Default spend authorization remains Ed25519/secp256k1; users can still create new quantum-vulnerable accounts by default; no enforcement, deprecation, or freeze mechanism for unmigrated classical keys (cap 60).
  • No independent audit of the ML-DSA-65 implementation exists; quantum-critical implementation assurance is unverified by external review.

Key Risks

  • Consensus compromise risk: Validator endorsement/skip messages are signed with Ed25519. A quantum adversary capable of forging Ed25519 signatures could disrupt finality, enable double-signing, or halt block production. This is a quantum-critical vulnerability affecting the entire network.
  • Chain Signatures MPC bridge risk: The 5-of-8 threshold MPC network uses classical ECDSA/EdDSA to sign cross-chain transactions for 35+ external blockchains. Quantum compromise could drain cross-chain assets. Post-quantum MPC remains in research with no production timeline.
  • Default vulnerability persistence: All new accounts are created with Ed25519 keys by default. Users must proactively rotate to ML-DSA. Without default PQ or enforcement, the vast majority of value will remain quantum-vulnerable indefinitely.
  • Long-exposure key risk: All NEAR accounts that have submitted transactions have exposed Ed25519 or secp256k1 public keys on-chain, creating an at-rest attack surface for offline quantum key-recovery attacks with no time constraint.
  • Unverified implementation: The ML-DSA-65 implementation in nearcore has not undergone independent third-party cryptographic audit. While it uses the aws-lc-rs backend and received internal code review, the absence of external validation creates uncertainty about implementation correctness for a security-critical new primitive.
  • Ecosystem readiness gap: Hardware wallets, browser extension wallets, exchanges (Rosetta), and mirror/fork networks do not yet support ML-DSA-65, creating a multi-year downstream dependency before institutional migration becomes practical.
  • No emergency quantum response process: The absence of a published quantum-specific incident-response playbook or emergency governance process means the protocol lacks a documented mechanism to respond to a sudden quantum breakthrough.

Assurance Notes

  • No independent cryptographic audit of the FIPS-204 (ML-DSA-65) implementation in nearcore has been identified as of the July 20, 2026 mainnet launch. Internal code review from multiple NEAR contributors exists but no external third-party cryptographic audit was conducted.
  • Hacken audit of nearcore (October 2023) is stale and covers only classical protocol security—does not assess the ML-DSA implementation or quantum readiness.
  • Trail of Bits audits of NEAR MPC components (PedPop+, Chain Signatures, Robust ECDSA, Confidential Key Derivation) in 2025-2026 are current for MPC scope but do not cover PQ signature integration.
  • No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook or emergency governance process has been published.
  • Hardware wallet support for ML-DSA/FIPS-204 does not exist. Near One is collaborating with Ledger but no PQ hardware wallet is available, limiting institutional and cold-storage migration.
  • ML-DSA signatures (3,309 bytes) and public keys (1,952 bytes) are significantly larger than Ed25519 (~64 bytes), creating downstream bandwidth, storage, and gas cost implications. The protocol stores public keys as 32-byte SHA3-256 hashes on-trie and charges +100 Ggas for verification, but comprehensive resource-impact analysis across all wallet, API, and indexing infrastructure is not published.
  • The NEAR CLI supports ML-DSA key rotation, but broader wallet ecosystem support (browser extensions, mobile wallets, exchanges) is not yet available.
  • Consensus/validator authentication remains Ed25519-only with no PQ path announced; official May 2026 blog states this requires 'longer-term research.'
  • Chain Signatures MPC network (5-of-8 threshold, 35+ chains) uses classical threshold ECDSA/EdDSA; post-quantum MPC remains in research stage with no announced timeline.

Non-Scoring Caveats

  • Hardware wallet support for ML-DSA does not exist; Ledger collaboration is ongoing but no timeline for PQ hardware wallet availability. This is an operational/product caveat that limits institutional migration but does not create a new quantum-vulnerable path—the protocol-level PQ path exists.
  • No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook published. This is an assurance-only caveat; the absence does not create a quantum-vulnerable path but reduces operational readiness confidence.
  • No formal performance benchmark for ML-DSA at scale. Basic gas costing exists (+100 Ggas) but comprehensive resource-impact analysis across validators, indexers, and archival nodes is not published.
  • Rosetta API and mirror/fork-network do not yet support ML-DSA-65 keys, limiting exchange and infrastructure integration.
  • Future PQ-to-PQ upgrade uncertainty for consensus and Chain Signatures MPC does not affect current production scope scoring but represents roadmap risk.

Evidence record

Claims and Caveats

Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness

Public cryptographic inventory and quantum threat model

Claim: NEAR has published a comprehensive cryptographic inventory identifying Ed25519 (default), secp256k1 (alternative), and the Chain Signatures MPC threshold schemes as quantum-vulnerable, with threat model covering accounts, consensus, and cross-chain infrastructure.

Coverage basis: Public documentation and official blog posts

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Primary sources from NEAR Protocol team (CTO blog post May 2026, official blog May 2026). Inventory is detailed and specific about affected layers and algorithms.

The cryptographic inventory explicitly identifies Ed25519, secp256k1, and MPC threshold ECDSA/EdDSA as quantum-vulnerable. The threat model covers account spend authorization, consensus validator signatures, and Chain Signatures cross-chain infrastructure.

Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness

Public evidence record supporting the assessment

Claim: NEAR provides code references (nearcore GitHub), protocol specification (Nomicon), design documents, and reproducible analytics supporting the quantum risk assessment.

Coverage basis: Open-source code, protocol specification, design documentation

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: All evidence is publicly verifiable. nearcore is open-source (Rust). Nomicon provides protocol-level specification. ML-DSA implementation commit history is traceable with design rationale.

Evidence record is strong for the account/transaction layer. Consensus and P2P cryptographic documentation is available through Nomicon and source code. Chain Signatures MPC documentation is less detailed for cryptographic specifics.

Production Cryptographic Protection

Spend authorization / transaction signatures

Claim: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS-204) is available as an optional third signature scheme on mainnet since July 20, 2026 (upgrade 2.13, protocol version 86). Default signing remains Ed25519. Users can rotate access keys to ML-DSA via NEAR CLI in a single transaction.

Coverage basis: Optional mainnet PQ support; not default, mandatory, or enforced

Implementation score: 0.75 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Default spend authorization remains Ed25519/secp256k1; users can still create new quantum-vulnerable accounts by default (cap 60).

Assurance: Mainnet activation confirmed by nearcore 2.13.0 release notes, PR Newswire announcement, and GitHub commit history. ML-DSA-65 is gated by protocol feature flag, stabilized at protocol version 85/86. Implementation uses aws-lc-rs backend. No independent audit of the ML-DSA implementation exists.

Score 0.75 reflects optional mainnet support. Full 1.00 would require default, mandatory, or enforced PQ signing. The upgrade went live only ~5 days before evaluation; ecosystem tooling (wallets, exchanges) has not yet adopted ML-DSA.

Production Cryptographic Protection

Account, address, public-key exposure, and key-derivation design

Claim: NEAR accounts use human-readable account IDs decoupled from cryptography with rotatable access keys. Migration to ML-DSA does not require address changes. However, existing accounts have exposed Ed25519/secp256k1 public keys on-chain creating long-exposure attack surfaces.

Coverage basis: Structural design advantage with existing exposed classical keys

Implementation score: 0.75 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The decoupled account model is a verified architectural property present since mainnet launch in 2020. Key rotation is a standard account operation. However, all accounts that have ever transacted have exposed classical public keys on-chain, creating a long-exposure at-rest attack surface.

Score 0.75 rather than 1.00 because while the account model elegantly solves address-migration problems, existing exposed public keys remain quantum-vulnerable at rest. The design prevents new exposure only if users rotate to ML-DSA.

Production Cryptographic Protection

Consensus-critical authentication (validator signatures, VRFs, block certificates)

Claim: NEAR's Doomslug consensus requires validators to sign endorsement and skip messages using Ed25519 signatures. Block production and finality depend on these validator signatures. No PQ path exists for consensus authentication.

Coverage basis: Ed25519-only validator signatures; no PQ path

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: cap-applying

Quantum blocker: Consensus/validator authentication remains Ed25519-only. Quantum forgery of validator approval signatures could compromise finality and block production. Official blog (May 2026) confirms consensus requires longer-term research. Cap 70 applies.

Assurance: Confirmed by Nomicon protocol specification and nearcore source code. The CoinMarketCap secondary source claiming validator signatures were made PQ-safe in 2.13 is contradicted by the official nearcore 2.13.0 release notes which describe ML-DSA only as a 'transaction-signature and access-key scheme' and by the May 2026 official blog stating consensus requires longer-term research.

This is a critical quantum blocker. NEAR is a PoS chain where validator authentication is a core applicable layer. The 2.13 upgrade did not include consensus PQ protection. The secondary claim (CoinMarketCap) that validators were made PQ-safe is not corroborated by any primary source and is treated as a misunderstanding.

Production Cryptographic Protection

State-integrity and data-availability mechanisms

Claim: NEAR uses hash-based Merkle state commitments (SHA-256/Keccak variants) without KZG/pairing-based commitments, ZK proof systems, or other quantum-vulnerable cryptographic accumulators at the protocol level.

Coverage basis: Hash-based state integrity; satisfied by design

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Verified from Nomicon specification and nearcore architecture. No independent audit specifically confirming the absence of quantum-vulnerable state-binding mechanisms, but the hash-based design is well-understood and verifiable from public code.

Satisfied by design. NEAR's Nightshade sharding uses hash-based Merkle proofs for state verification. Unlike Ethereum's planned KZG-based data availability sampling, NEAR uses Reed-Solomon erasure coding which does not depend on pairing assumptions.

Production Cryptographic Protection

Privacy and proof layers

Claim: NEAR Protocol does not have a native privacy layer, shielded transactions, or ZK proof system at the protocol level.

Coverage basis: No privacy layer exists

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Confirmed by protocol documentation and architecture review. No privacy features exist at the base layer.

N/A. Application-layer privacy solutions built on NEAR (if any) are outside the native asset evaluation scope.

Production Cryptographic Protection

P2P transport, node identity, and peer authentication

Claim: NEAR nodes use Ed25519-based identities for P2P peer authentication and message signing. No PQ protection exists for the P2P layer.

Coverage basis: Classical P2P cryptography; not satisfied by design

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: P2P identity is not directly asset-spending-critical, but it is consensus-adjacent (nodes sign and propagate consensus messages). A quantum-enabled P2P identity compromise could enable eclipse attacks or consensus message manipulation. Not satisfied by design because spend authorization is not universally PQ-signed.

Score 0.00 reflects classical-only P2P cryptography. While P2P compromise does not directly enable asset theft, it is a network-layer vulnerability that could affect consensus message propagation.

Production Cryptographic Protection

Critical wallet, custody, HSM, signer, and hardware-wallet workflows

Claim: NEAR CLI supports ML-DSA key rotation. Hardware wallets (Ledger, etc.) do not support ML-DSA. Software wallet ecosystem support is not yet available. Exchange/custody integration (Rosetta) does not support ML-DSA.

Coverage basis: CLI-only PQ tooling; no hardware or institutional custody support

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: operational/product caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Hardware wallet gap is confirmed by official PR and QRI draft report. NEAR is collaborating with Ledger but no PQ hardware wallet exists. This is primarily an operational/product caveat—the protocol-level PQ path exists but critical custody infrastructure cannot use it.

Score 0.25 reflects that CLI tooling exists (prototype-level integration for the custody path) but hardware wallets, exchanges, and institutional custody—which secure the majority of value—cannot use ML-DSA.

Migration Status & Value-at-Risk

Percentage of economically relevant value-at-risk protected

Claim: ML-DSA went live on mainnet ~5 days before evaluation. Migration is opt-in. No data on migration coverage exists. Effectively ~0% of value-at-risk is protected by PQ signatures.

Coverage basis: Negligible migration coverage; <25%

Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Near-zero migration coverage; all value (~$3B+ market cap, ~$200M+ DeFi TVL) remains on quantum-vulnerable Ed25519/secp256k1 keys with exposed public keys.

Assurance: No on-chain migration metrics are publicly available. The upgrade activated ~5 days before evaluation. Given the opt-in nature and lack of wallet/ecosystem support, migration coverage is reasonably estimated at <1%. Exact coverage cannot be verified without on-chain analytics.

Score 0.05 reflects <25% coverage per QRI coverage thresholds (score 1 out of 20 subfactor weight = 0.05 Implementation Score). NEAR's decoupled account model means migration is technically simple (one transaction), but ecosystem readiness and user awareness are the bottlenecks.

Migration Status & Value-at-Risk

Critical wallets migrated, protected, or inherently PQ-native

Claim: No evidence that NEAR Foundation treasury, major exchanges, custodians, bridges, or protocol-controlled wallets have migrated to ML-DSA keys.

Coverage basis: No critical wallet migration evidenced

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No public attestations or on-chain evidence of critical wallet migration. Given the upgrade recency (~5 days) and lack of hardware wallet support, it is highly unlikely any major institutional holder has migrated.

Score 0.00. Critical wallets (treasuries, exchanges, bridges) hold disproportionate value-at-risk. Their migration status is unknown but almost certainly unmigrated given the upgrade recency and ecosystem readiness gaps.

Migration Status & Value-at-Risk

Legacy vulnerable pools/accounts/UTXOs/contracts identified, measurable, deprecated, migrated, frozen, or proven not to exist by design

Claim: NEAR has identified the vulnerable surface (all Ed25519/secp256k1 accounts) but has no deprecation, freeze, burn, or enforcement mechanism for unmigrated classical keys.

Coverage basis: Identified but not deprecated or enforced

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The vulnerable surface is well-documented in official blogs. However, there is no published policy for deprecating, freezing, or burning unmigrated vulnerable value. No enforcement mechanism exists to prevent users from keeping or creating new classical keys.

Score 0.25 reflects that the vulnerable surface is identified (public inventory exists) but no measurable deprecation, freeze, or enforcement mechanism exists. The protocol allows indefinite coexistence of classical and PQ keys with no migration deadline.

Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination

Public migration or protection roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, and dependencies

Claim: NEAR has published a phased roadmap: Phase 1 (accounts/ML-DSA) delivered July 2026; Phase 2 (consensus/validators) in longer-term research; Phase 3 (Chain Signatures MPC) in research by Defuse team.

Coverage basis: Partial roadmap with delivered Phase 1; later phases in research

Implementation score: 0.75 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Phase 1 (account-level ML-DSA) delivered on schedule. Phase 2 (consensus) and Phase 3 (Chain Signatures MPC) have no committed timelines—described as 'longer-term research' and 'actively working' respectively. Roadmap is public and specific for delivered phase but uncertain for remaining phases.

Score 0.75 reflects a concrete, versioned roadmap with specific algorithm choice (FIPS-204) and delivered Phase 1, but incomplete sequencing for consensus and bridge layers with no committed dates for remaining phases.

Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination

Migration accessibility and defaults

Claim: NEAR CLI supports ML-DSA key rotation. No default PQ account creation. No migration prompts or warnings. No hardware wallet support. No browser-extension or mobile wallet PQ support. No exchange custody path.

Coverage basis: CLI-only tooling; no defaults, prompts, or broad ecosystem support

Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: operational/product caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: CLI support is confirmed by PR Newswire and release notes. Hardware wallet gap confirmed by multiple sources. The absence of default PQ, migration prompts, and broad wallet support means migration is accessible only to technically sophisticated users.

Score 0.50 reflects prototype/limited integration status: CLI tooling exists (comparable to testnet-level accessibility for the average user) but the broader ecosystem—wallets, exchanges, hardware devices—cannot use PQ signing.

Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination

Migration enforcement and coordination

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms exist. Classical keys (Ed25519/secp256k1) remain fully supported with no deprecation timeline. No freeze, burn, or mandatory migration policy. No exchange or custody coordination for migration.

Coverage basis: No enforcement or coordination mechanisms

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No enforcement, deprecation, or freeze mechanism for classical keys. Users can indefinitely maintain quantum-vulnerable accounts and create new ones by default.

Assurance: The 2.13 release notes confirm ML-DSA is added alongside existing schemes with no deprecation of Ed25519 or secp256k1. No migration deadline or enforcement mechanism has been proposed or documented.

Score 0.00. The protocol currently treats ML-DSA as an additive option rather than a migration. There is no path to deprecate classical keys, no mechanism to prevent new classical accounts, and no coordination with exchanges or custodians for migration.

Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination

Emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process for quantum-related vulnerabilities

Claim: No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook or emergency governance process has been published.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific emergency process

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Absence confirmed by QRI draft report and lack of any published quantum-specific IR documentation. NEAR likely has general security incident processes but nothing quantum-specific is publicly documented.

Score 0.00. While NEAR likely has general governance and upgrade processes (demonstrated by the 2.13 upgrade itself), no quantum-specific emergency response playbook, disclosure process, or accelerated governance path for quantum breakthroughs has been published.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Uses NIST-standardized, standards-track, or broadly reviewed PQC/hybrid-PQC algorithms

Claim: NEAR uses ML-DSA-65 (FIPS-204), a NIST-standardized post-quantum signature scheme formally standardized in August 2024.

Coverage basis: NIST FIPS-204 standardized algorithm

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS-204) is a NIST-standardized module-lattice-based signature scheme. This is the strongest possible algorithm choice for post-quantum signatures. NEAR's selection of a NIST standard rather than a bespoke or pre-standardization algorithm is appropriate.

Full score. ML-DSA-65 is the appropriate NIST-standardized choice for general-purpose post-quantum signatures.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Independent cryptographic and implementation audit for quantum-critical scope

Claim: No independent third-party audit of the ML-DSA-65 implementation in nearcore has been identified. The PR #15731 received internal code review from multiple NEAR contributors but no external cryptographic audit was conducted.

Coverage basis: No independent audit; internal review only

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No independent audit of the ML-DSA-65 implementation exists. Implementation correctness for this security-critical new primitive is unverified by external review.

Assurance: PR #15731 received review from @frol, @ssavenko-near, @Trisfald, and @wacban—all NEAR contributors. While the review appears thorough (multiple rounds, 31 files changed), it does not constitute an independent third-party cryptographic audit. The aws-lc-rs backend provides some assurance for the underlying ML-DSA primitive, but integration correctness, key handling, signature verification logic, and protocol-level security require independent validation.

Score 0.00. The absence of independent audit is a quantum-critical uncertainty—while the implementation may be correct, this cannot be verified without external review.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Open-source, reproducible implementation

Claim: The nearcore reference client is fully open-source (Rust) with public commit history, build instructions, and reproducible verification paths.

Coverage basis: Open-source repository with public commit history

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: nearcore is a well-maintained open-source repository with clear contribution history. The ML-DSA implementation is traceable through specific commits with design documentation. Build and test infrastructure is publicly available.

Full score. The implementation is fully open-source with detailed commit history, code review records, and design documentation.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Parameter agility and future upgrade path

Claim: NEAR's multi-scheme key architecture (KeyType enum with Ed25519, secp256k1, ML-DSA-65) demonstrates parameter agility. Design document addresses future considerations.

Coverage basis: Multi-scheme architecture with documented upgrade path

Implementation score: 0.75 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: The KeyType enum with borsh tags (0=Ed25519, 1=secp256k1, 2=ML-DSA-65) provides clean parameter agility. The design doc explicitly addresses resolved vs. remaining work. Mirror/fork-network and Rosetta gaps are documented as known limitations.

Score 0.75 rather than 1.00 because: (1) mirror/fork-network PQ-key support is documented as incomplete follow-up work, (2) Rosetta API does not support ML-DSA-65, and (3) the upgrade path for consensus and Chain Signatures MPC layers is not yet designed.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Stateful-signature safety, side-channel, fault-injection, state-management, hardware-wallet, HSM, or custody implementation risks

Claim: ML-DSA-65 is a stateless signature scheme (unlike XMSS/LMS), eliminating state-management risks. The implementation uses aws-lc-rs backend. No side-channel analysis, fault-injection assessment, or hardware security evaluation has been published.

Coverage basis: Stateless scheme; no published side-channel or hardware security analysis

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Low

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: ML-DSA is stateless, which eliminates the state-management risks associated with XMSS/LMS-style hash-based signatures. However, lattice-based schemes like ML-DSA have their own side-channel considerations. No side-channel evaluation, fault-injection assessment, or hardware security analysis has been published.

Score 0.25 reflects that the stateless nature of ML-DSA eliminates one class of risk, and the aws-lc-rs backend provides some implementation assurance, but no formal side-channel or hardware security evaluation exists.

Algorithm & Implementation Assurance

Performance and resource-impact analysis

Claim: NEAR has documented ML-DSA-65 key sizes (1,952 bytes public key, 3,309 bytes signature, 4,032 bytes secret key), on-trie storage optimization (32-byte SHA3-256 hash), and verification cost (+100 Ggas). No comprehensive performance benchmark across validator, indexer, and archival infrastructure has been published.

Coverage basis: Basic gas costing and size documentation; no comprehensive benchmark

Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The 2.13 release notes document the +100 Ggas verification charge and the on-trie hash optimization (32 bytes vs 1,952 bytes). However, no comprehensive benchmark exists covering: block validation impact with multiple ML-DSA signatures, mempool size implications, archival storage growth, bandwidth impact for validators and indexers, or resource requirements for hardware wallets and mobile devices.

Score 0.50 reflects that basic performance analysis exists (gas costing, storage optimization) but comprehensive resource-impact analysis across the full infrastructure stack is not published.

Report metadata

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