Ondo US Dollar Yield USDY

Claim: USDY has not published any cryptographic inventory, quantum threat model, or quantum risk assessment.

Coverage basis: Absence of any project-published quantum readiness documentation

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory (Readiness & Risk Cap: 10)

Assurance: Ondo Finance's Trust & Security documentation covers institutional partners, transparency, and legal compliance but contains zero mention of cryptography, quantum threats, or post-quantum planning.

This evaluation itself constitutes the first public cryptographic inventory and quantum threat model for USDY's token-specific surfaces.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/trust-and-security
• https://docs.ondo.finance/general-access-products/usdy/basics
• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses

Claim: No project-published evidence record exists. This QRI evaluation assembles evidence from on-chain data, contract verification, and third-party analysis.

Coverage basis: Evaluator-assembled evidence from Etherscan, Ondo docs, Staking Rewards risk rating, IPFS technical documentation

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Evidence is assembled from multiple independent sources. The evidence is credible and consistent but has not been assembled or acknowledged by the project itself.

Implementation Score of 0.25 reflects that this evaluation produces a public evidence record, equivalent to a 'draft specification or research plan' level.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0x96F6eF951840721AdBF46Ac996b59E0235CB985C
• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x1a694a09494e214a3be3652e4b343b7b81a73ad7
• https://github.com/stakingrewards/defi-risk-rating/blob/master/ratings/Ondo-USDY.md
• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses
• https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmVLyZow92cB4j1fXzVc1LCEwW16F9UxtyoWLtHHW7FUh7

Claim: Token-level admin authorization (mint, burn, freeze, pause, upgrade, blocklist management) uses Gnosis Safe 4-of-7 ECDSA multisigs. User-level transfers inherit host-chain signature schemes. No PQC or hybrid-PQC exists at any layer.

Coverage basis: Admin authorization via Gnosis Safe multisig (ECDSA); user transfers via host-chain inheritance

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Admin multisig authorization is entirely ECDSA-only with exposed public keys. No PQC or hybrid path exists.

Assurance: Verified on-chain: Management Multisig (0xAEd4ca...) has 202+ executed transactions confirming public key exposure. Both use Gnosis Safe Singleton 1.3.0 with ECDSA secp256k1 signatures.

User-level transfers inherit host-chain QRI and are not evaluated here. Token-specific admin authorization is the critical surface.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x1a694a09494e214a3be3652e4b343b7b81a73ad7
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x677fd4ed8ae623f2f625deb2d64f2070e46ca1a1
• https://github.com/stakingrewards/defi-risk-rating/blob/master/ratings/Ondo-USDY.md

Claim: Admin multisig signers have executed transactions, permanently exposing their ECDSA public keys on Ethereum mainnet. This is a long-exposure (at-rest) quantum vulnerability with no key rotation, address migration, or exposure-mitigation design.

Coverage basis: On-chain transaction history of admin multisig addresses

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Long-exposure admin public keys with no rotation, deprecation, or migration mechanism. HNDL attack surface is permanent.

Assurance: Management Multisig (0xAEd4ca...) shows 202+ transactions on Etherscan with 'Exec Transaction' method calls, confirming repeated ECDSA signature exposure.

Per QRI Section 7.3 (Attack-Window Classification), this is a long-exposure (at-rest) surface — the most immediate quantum risk category.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x677fd4ed8ae623f2f625deb2d64f2070e46ca1a1

Claim: USDY is a token, not a consensus network. Consensus authentication is not applicable at the token level.

Coverage basis: Token architecture — no native consensus mechanism

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: USDY is a standard ERC-20 token with no custom state-integrity, commitment, or data-availability mechanisms beyond the host chain's native security.

Coverage basis: Standard ERC-20 token architecture

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

The USDY token does incorporate transfer hooks for blocklist/sanctions enforcement, but these are logical checks (address lookups) rather than cryptographic state-integrity mechanisms.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0x96F6eF951840721AdBF46Ac996b59E0235CB985C

Claim: USDY has no privacy layer, zero-knowledge proofs, shielded transactions, or confidential transfer mechanisms.

Coverage basis: Standard transparent ERC-20 token

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

• https://etherscan.io/address/0x96F6eF951840721AdBF46Ac996b59E0235CB985C

Claim: USDY is a token, not a peer-to-peer network. P2P transport and node identity are not applicable at the token level.

Coverage basis: Token architecture — no native P2P network

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: Admin multisig signers use standard ECDSA wallets (Gnosis Safe) with no PQ or hybrid signing path. There is no evidence of HSM usage, PQ-compatible custody, or hardware-wallet support for post-quantum admin operations.

Coverage basis: On-chain evidence of Gnosis Safe multisig usage; absence of any PQ wallet documentation

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Admin signers use standard ECDSA wallets with no PQ-compatible custody or signing path.

Assurance: Signer identities are undisclosed, so the specific wallet/HSM configurations cannot be independently verified. However, Gnosis Safe's standard ECDSA secp256k1 signature scheme is confirmed by on-chain contract verification.

Per the Staking Rewards risk assessment, both multisigs share 6/7 signers, and signer identities are not publicly disclosed.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x1a694a09494e214a3be3652e4b343b7b81a73ad7

Claim: 0% of token-specific value-at-risk is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. The admin multisig controls ~$994M in TVL across all chains. No PQ protection exists for any token-specific surface.

Coverage basis: Total value locked / assets under management (~$994M as of March 2026)

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: 0% value-at-risk coverage. Admin keys control the entire token supply across all chains with no quantum protection.

Assurance: AUM figure of ~$994M is from Staking Rewards (March 2026). The Ondo Finance: Multisig 2 (0x677fd4...) holds ~$1.85B in token value as of June 2026 per Etherscan.

Per QRI Section 9.3.1, this falls into '<25% — Experimental/negligible protection' territory, but the Implementation Score is 0.00 because there is zero protection.

• https://www.stakingrewards.com/defi/0x96f6ef951840721adbf46ac996b59e0235cb985c
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x677fd4ed8ae623f2f625deb2d64f2070e46ca1a1

Claim: No critical wallets (admin multisigs, bridge operators, treasury) have been migrated to PQ-safe schemes. All use classical ECDSA.

Coverage basis: On-chain verification of multisig contract type (Gnosis Safe with ECDSA)

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Zero critical wallets migrated to PQ-safe schemes.

Assurance: Both admin multisigs (ProxyAdmin owner and Management) are standard Gnosis Safe 1.3.0 proxies using ECDSA secp256k1.

USDY is not PQ-native and has no classical-ownership-free design.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x1a694a09494e214a3be3652e4b343b7b81a73ad7

Claim: No identification, measurement, deprecation, or migration of quantum-vulnerable admin key surfaces has been performed.

Coverage basis: Absence of any deprecation, freeze, or migration documentation or on-chain activity

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No identification or deprecation of quantum-vulnerable admin key surfaces.

Assurance: The absence of any quantum-related documentation, on-chain migration activity, or deprecation events is confirmed by comprehensive search of Ondo docs, Etherscan history, and third-party analyses.

The admin multisigs are actively used with no indication of planned key rotation, deprecation, or migration.

Claim: No migration or protection roadmap exists for any token-specific quantum-vulnerable surface.

Coverage basis: Absence of any roadmap, proposal, or planning documentation

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Comprehensive search of all Ondo Finance official channels confirms zero quantum-related roadmap content.

This is classified as quantum-critical uncertainty because the absence of a roadmap prevents verification of any future migration path.

Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist for token-specific admin operations.

Coverage basis: Absence of any PQ migration tooling or user-facing features

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: For token-specific admin operations (not end-user transfers), migration accessibility means the ability for multisig signers to transition to PQ-safe signing schemes.

End-user transfer migration is inherited from host chains.

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms (deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking) exist for quantum-vulnerable admin surfaces. No exchange, custody, bridge, wallet, or infrastructure coordination for quantum migration has been initiated.

Coverage basis: Absence of any enforcement or coordination activity

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No evidence of quantum-specific coordination with any external party.

The Ondo Bridge's dependency on LayerZero creates a coordination requirement that spans multiple independent projects, none of which have published quantum migration roadmaps.

Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure process, incident-response plan, or governance framework exists.

Coverage basis: Absence of any quantum-specific incident-response documentation

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Per QRI Section 8.2, the absence of a formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook does not by itself create a Readiness & Risk Cap.

The project has a general Immunefi bug bounty program and classical security audits, but these do not constitute quantum-specific incident response capability.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/trust-and-security

Claim: No PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms are used anywhere in the USDY token system. All token-specific cryptography is classical ECDSA (secp256k1).

Coverage basis: On-chain verification of Gnosis Safe multisig (ECDSA secp256k1); absence of any PQC deployment

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No NIST-standardized PQC algorithms deployed for any token-specific cryptographic function.

Assurance: NIST finalized PQC standards in August 2024 (FIPS 203 ML-KEM, FIPS 204 ML-DSA, FIPS 205 SLH-DSA). No evidence of any of these being evaluated or deployed for USDY admin operations.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367

Claim: Multiple independent audits exist for USDY smart contracts but none address quantum readiness, post-quantum cryptography, or quantum threat models.

Coverage basis: Existing classical audits (Spearbit, Halborn, Code4rena, Cyfrin, Nethermind, Zokyo); zero quantum-specific audit coverage

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: Audits are extensive for classical security (8+ independent audits) but scope-mismatched for quantum readiness. The most recent audit (Spearbit, March 2025) covers smart contract security but not cryptographic migration or quantum resistance.

Per QRI Section 6.4, scope-mismatched audits support only the audited component.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/audits
• https://github.com/stakingrewards/defi-risk-rating/blob/master/ratings/Ondo-USDY.md

Claim: USDY smart contracts are verified on Etherscan with Solidity v0.8.16 source code publicly available. The implementation uses standard OpenZeppelin libraries.

Coverage basis: Etherscan contract verification; GitHub source code availability

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Contracts are verified on Etherscan and source code is available on GitHub. This transparency enables community assessment of quantum vulnerability in the classical implementation.

This is the only subfactor earning a non-zero Implementation Score.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0x96F6eF951840721AdBF46Ac996b59E0235CB985C
• https://github.com/ondoprotocol/usdy

Claim: No documented parameter agility or future upgrade path exists for migrating token-specific cryptography to post-quantum algorithms.

Coverage basis: Absence of any cryptographic agility documentation or PQ upgrade planning

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: The USDY contract uses OpenZeppelin's TransparentUpgradeableProxy pattern, which technically enables contract upgrades. However, there is no documented plan for how this upgrade mechanism would be used to transition to PQ-safe admin signatures.

Classified as assurance-only because the absence of documented parameter agility does not itself create a quantum attack vector.

Claim: No stateful PQ signatures (XMSS/LMS-style) are used, so stateful-signature safety considerations are not applicable to the current implementation.

Coverage basis: No PQ signature deployment of any kind

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

If USDY migrates to stateful PQ signatures (e.g., XMSS/LMS for admin operations), this subfactor would become applicable.

Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis has been conducted for deploying PQ signatures in the USDY admin workflow.

Coverage basis: Absence of any performance analysis or benchmarking

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Per QRI Section 8.2, the absence of a formal performance benchmark does not create a Readiness & Risk Cap by itself. For admin multisig operations (infrequent, low-throughput), PQ signature size and verification cost are unlikely to be deployment blockers.

Admin multisig operations are low-frequency (202 transactions over ~4 years). The performance impact of PQ signatures (~3-8 KB per signature vs. ~65 bytes for ECDSA) would be negligible for this use case.