OUSG OUSG

Claim: Ondo Finance has not published a cryptographic inventory of critical public-key mechanisms or a quantum threat model covering attack assumptions, affected assets, and affected layers.

Coverage basis: No evidence of any quantum-specific assessment published by the project.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: cap-applying

Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model published by Ondo Finance

Assurance: Ondo ToS Section 10.3 mentions quantum computing as a general risk but does not inventory specific cryptographic mechanisms, attack surfaces, or affected assets. No QRI-qualifying risk assessment exists. Reviewed official docs, blog posts, and announcements — zero mention of post-quantum cryptography, quantum risk assessment, or PQC migration.

ToS Section 10.3 states quantum computers 'may present risks to Digital Assets and the Services' — this is a legal disclaimer, not a cryptographic inventory or threat model per QRI requirements.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/overview
• https://docs.ondo.finance/trust-and-security
• https://docs.ondo.finance/audits

Claim: No public evidence record supporting a quantum risk assessment exists. Contract addresses, verified source code, and classical audits are publicly available but have not been assembled into any quantum-specific assessment by the project.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific evidence record published by the project.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Contract code is verified on Etherscan and GitHub. Classical audit reports exist. However, none of this has been organized into a quantum risk evidence record by Ondo Finance.

Third-party analysis (bmic.ai, 2026) identifies OUSG's ECDSA admin key vulnerability but this is not an Ondo-published assessment.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses
• https://etherscan.io/token/0x1b19c19393e2d034d8ff31ff34c81252fcbbee92
• https://docs.ondo.finance/audits

Claim: OUSG is a standard ERC-20 token (and SPL token on Solana, issued currency on XRPL) with no custom cryptographic primitives. All transaction authorization relies on host-chain ECDSA (Ethereum/Polygon), EdDSA (Solana), or ECDSA/EdDSA (XRPL) signatures.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain signature schemes; no PQ or hybrid-PQC spend authorization exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All spend authorization is ECDSA/EdDSA-only with no PQ or hybrid-PQC path

Assurance: Contract is a verified proxy implementing standard ERC-20 with KYC extensions. No custom signature verification. Inherits Ethereum's ECDSA spend authorization model.

Per QRI Section 7.2 (Token Inheritance), OUSG inherently shares the base-layer QRI score of its host chains. All host chains use classical ECC for spend authorization in current production.

• https://etherscan.io/token/0x1b19c19393e2d034d8ff31ff34c81252fcbbee92
• https://docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/technical
• https://github.com/ondoprotocol/tokenized-funds/blob/main/contracts/token/CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol

Claim: OUSG holders use standard Ethereum addresses (exposing public key on spend), Solana addresses (EdDSA public keys), and XRPL addresses. No PQ/hybrid address format or key-derivation design exists. Admin multisig address has sent transactions, exposing signer public keys.

Coverage basis: Standard host-chain address models with no PQ protection.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Public keys of EOAs that have sent transactions are exposed on-chain and vulnerable to long-exposure 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks.

Admin multisig address (0xAEd4caF2...) has sent transactions, exposing signer public keys. KYC-registered holder addresses that have transferred OUSG also have exposed public keys on their respective chains.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses
• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367

Claim: OUSG is a token, not a blockchain. It has no consensus mechanism, validator set, or block production of its own.

Coverage basis: Not applicable to a tokenized asset.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: OUSG token supply integrity is controlled by admin roles (MINTER_ROLE, BURNER_ROLE) secured by the ECDSA multisig. There are no KZG/pairing-based commitments, nullifiers, accumulators, or bridge verification logic in the OUSG token contract itself.

Coverage basis: Token supply integrity depends on ECDSA admin keys.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Token admin/governance keys are ECDSA-secured; quantum compromise would enable unlimited minting/burning and supply manipulation

Assurance: Verified on-chain: ProxyAdmin at 0xba80aa44cc25e85cc30359150dfb1c7d041cf6d5 owned by 4-of-7 Safe at 0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367. Roles include MINTER_ROLE, BURNER_ROLE, PAUSER_ROLE, MANAGER_ADMIN. No timelock.

BURNER_ROLE can burn tokens from any address. A quantum attacker controlling the multisig could drain all OUSG holders by burning their tokens or minting unlimited supply.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://github.com/stakingrewards/defi-risk-rating/blob/master/ratings/Ondo-OUSG.md

Claim: OUSG has no privacy layer, ZK proofs, shielded transactions, note encryption, or stealth addresses.

Coverage basis: Not applicable.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: OUSG is a token, not a P2P network. It has no independent node discovery, peer authentication, or P2P transport layer.

Coverage basis: Not applicable.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: OUSG admin operations are controlled by a 4-of-7 Gnosis Safe multisig using ECDSA signatures. No PQ/hybrid wallet, custody, HSM, or hardware-wallet support exists for admin key management. OUSG holders use standard ECDSA/EdDSA wallets.

Coverage basis: All critical wallet workflows rely on classical ECC.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Admin multisig is a standard Gnosis Safe (Safe 1.3.0) using ECDSA; no PQ hardware signing or custody path exists

Assurance: Safe 1.3.0 implementation at 0xd9db270c1b5e3bd161e8c8503c55ceabee709552 verified on Etherscan. Multisig signers use standard ECDSA keys with identities undisclosed.

The 6/7 signer overlap between OUSG and USDY multisigs means a single quantum key compromise could affect multiple Ondo products simultaneously.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://github.com/stakingrewards/defi-risk-rating/blob/master/ratings/Ondo-OUSG.md

Claim: 0% of OUSG value-at-risk is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. All approximately $556M-$625M in AUM is fully exposed through both inherited base-layer vulnerabilities and token-specific admin key vulnerabilities.

Coverage basis: No PQ protection exists for any OUSG value.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: 100% of value-at-risk is quantum-vulnerable with no migration, freeze, deprecation, burn, recovery, or policy path

Assurance: AUM figures: ondo.finance $556M (May 21 2026), rwa.xyz ~$625M (Q1 2026), eco.com ~$650M, tokenisedetfs.com $721.4M (March 2026). All value remains in ECDSA/EdDSA-controlled addresses with no PQ protection regardless of exact figure.

OUSG holders include institutions and qualified purchasers. Long-exposure risk applies to all holder addresses that have transferred OUSG, exposing their public keys on-chain.

• https://app.rwa.xyz/assets/OUSG
• https://etherscan.io/token/0x1b19c19393e2d034d8ff31ff34c81252fcbbee92
• https://ripple.com/insights/tokenized-treasuries-go-live-on-the-xrpl/

Claim: No critical wallets — including the admin multisig, Coinbase Prime custodian address, InstantManager, OUSG Recipient, or any operational addresses — have been migrated to or protected by PQC or hybrid-PQC controls.

Coverage basis: All critical wallets use classical ECC.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Admin multisig (4-of-7 Safe) and all operational wallets are ECDSA-only with no migration path

Assurance: All critical addresses confirmed via Ondo docs and Etherscan. Admin multisig at 0xAEd4caF2... is a standard Gnosis Safe with no PQC capabilities. Coinbase Prime custodian address (0xF67416a2C49f6A46FEe1c47681C5a3832cf8856c) is also an ECDSA EOA.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses
• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367

Claim: No legacy vulnerable pool identification, measurement, deprecation, or migration has been performed for quantum security purposes. OUSG has deprecated legacy contracts (OUSGManager, CashManager, KYCRegistry) but these were replaced for operational reasons, not quantum security.

Coverage basis: No quantum-motivated deprecation or pool identification exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Legacy contract deprecations are documented in Ondo's address page but were operational upgrades, not quantum-migration actions.

Deprecated legacy contracts include OUSGInstantManager (deprecated April 2025), KYCRegistry (deprecated April 2025), OUSGManager (deprecated April 2024), and CashManager (deprecated December 2023). None involved PQC.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/addresses

Claim: No public migration or protection roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, and dependencies exists for OUSG or its admin infrastructure.

Coverage basis: No roadmap published.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQC migration roadmap exists for OUSG or its admin infrastructure

Assurance: Ondo Summit 2026 (February 2026) made no quantum-related announcements. Ondo Chain roadmap focuses on institutional RWA infrastructure, not quantum migration of existing tokens.

XRPL's post-quantum roadmap (targeting 2028) is a host-chain initiative, not an Ondo-published OUSG migration plan. Ondo has not published any quantum risk assessment or migration plan for OUSG.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/
• https://summit.ondo.finance/

Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist for OUSG.

Coverage basis: No migration accessibility exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Ondo's user-facing documentation and web app contain no quantum-related warnings, migration guidance, or PQ account options.

OUSG minting/redemption is primarily through the ondo.finance web app using standard browser wallets (MetaMask, etc.) with classical ECDSA key management.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/overview
• https://ondo.finance/ousg

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms exist for quantum migration (no deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, or mandatory migration deadlines). No exchange, custody, bridge, wallet, or infrastructure coordination for quantum migration exists.

Coverage basis: No enforcement or coordination exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: OUSG has no DEX liquidity; all exits depend on Ondo-managed redemption paths. No quantum-motivated coordination with exchanges, custodians, or wallet providers exists.

OUSG's KYC/whitelist system and PAUSER_ROLE could theoretically be used to enforce migration if Ondo chose to, but no such plan exists.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/qualified-access-products/ousg/technical

Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process has been published by Ondo Finance.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific IR process exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Ondo has an Immunefi bug bounty program and general security practices, but no quantum-specific incident response procedures are documented. This is an assurance-only caveat per QRI Section 7.4: the absence of a quantum IR playbook does not create a new quantum attack path beyond those already identified and scored.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/trust-and-security

Claim: OUSG uses no PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms. All cryptography is classical ECDSA/EdDSA inherited from host chains and the Gnosis Safe multisig implementation.

Coverage basis: No PQC algorithms in use.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No NIST-standardized PQC algorithms are used anywhere in the OUSG token or admin infrastructure

Assurance: Gnosis Safe 1.3.0 uses ECDSA secp256k1. OUSG token contract (CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol) is standard OpenZeppelin-based ERC-20 with no custom cryptography.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0xAEd4caF2E535D964165B4392342F71bac77e8367
• https://github.com/ondoprotocol/tokenized-funds

Claim: No independent audit covering post-quantum cryptographic security exists. All existing audits (Spearbit, Cantina, Cyfrin, Halborn, Zellic, Code4rena) cover classical smart contract security only.

Coverage basis: No PQC audit exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: Classical audits are current (through 2026) and from reputable firms. However, audit scope is exclusively classical smart contract security — access control, logic bugs, reentrancy, etc. Zero PQC scope. Per QRI Section 7.4, scope-mismatched audits are confidence-only caveats when the quantum-critical property (no PQC implementation) is independently verifiable from on-chain data and source code.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/audits

Claim: OUSG token contracts and Gnosis Safe multisig are open source and verified on Etherscan. However, there is no PQC implementation to be open source or reproducible.

Coverage basis: Classical code is open source; no PQC code exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Source code is verified and publicly available. This subfactor scores 0.0 because there is no PQC implementation to evaluate for reproducibility, not because classical code is closed-source.

• https://etherscan.io/token/0x1b19c19393e2d034d8ff31ff34c81252fcbbee92
• https://github.com/ondoprotocol/tokenized-funds

Claim: No documented parameter agility or future PQC upgrade path exists for OUSG or its admin infrastructure.

Coverage basis: No agility or upgrade path documented.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: OUSG uses OpenZeppelin TransparentUpgradeableProxy which enables contract upgrades via the admin multisig. This provides a technical upgrade path, but no quantum-specific parameter agility or PQC upgrade plan has been documented.

The upgradeable proxy architecture could theoretically support a PQC migration if Ondo chose to implement one, but no such plan exists.

• https://docs.ondo.finance/

Claim: No stateful PQC signatures (XMSS/LMS) are used, so anti-reuse controls and signing-state discipline are not applicable to the current implementation.

Coverage basis: No stateful signatures in use.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis exists for PQC deployment on OUSG or its admin infrastructure, as no PQC implementation exists to analyze.

Coverage basis: No PQC performance analysis exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: This is an assurance-only caveat because the absence of performance analysis does not create a new quantum attack path; the classical-only implementation is already scored at 0.0 for all protection subfactors. Performance analysis would become relevant if/when Ondo develops a PQC migration plan. PQC signatures are typically larger and slower than ECDSA, but for a token with admin multisig operations (infrequent, low throughput), performance impact would likely be minimal.