Pump.fun PUMP

Claim: Solana ecosystem has published comprehensive cryptographic inventories and quantum threat models covering Ed25519, BLS12-381, account exposure, and consensus vulnerabilities. Pump.fun inherits this assessment for base-layer cryptography but has published no token-specific inventory.

Coverage basis: Inherited from Solana L1; no Pump.fun-specific inventory

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Solana L1 inventory is well-sourced from multiple independent teams (Jump Crypto, Anza, Helius, Blueshift). No Pump.fun-specific cryptographic inventory exists.

Pump.fun public docs (https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs) document program architecture but contain no quantum-specific content. Score reflects absence of token-specific assessment.

• https://solana.com/news/quantum-readiness
• https://www.anza.xyz/blog/securing-solana-against-a-powerful-quantum-adversary
• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography
• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana

Claim: Solana ecosystem has extensive public evidence including code references, SIMDs, prototype implementations, and research publications. Pump.fun has published no quantum-specific evidence.

Coverage basis: Inherited from Solana L1; no Pump.fun-specific evidence

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Solana PQC prototype code is publicly available. Pump.fun public docs contain no quantum-specific evidence.

Anza migration proof prototype at anza-xyz/cryptography/pull/10 demonstrates ~400kB proof generation in ~55ms. This is research-stage work, not production protection.

• https://github.com/anza-xyz/cryptography/pull/10
• https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/pull/461
• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs

Claim: PUMP token transfers and Pump.fun program interactions (buy, sell, create, migrate) are authorized exclusively by Ed25519 signatures on Solana mainnet. No PQC or hybrid-PQC spend path exists.

Coverage basis: Ed25519-only; inherited from Solana L1

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Active production spend authorization remains entirely Ed25519-only (inherited from Solana L1)

Assurance: Confirmed by Pump.fun IDL requiring user signer for all value-moving instructions and Solana runtime verifying Ed25519 signatures.

All buy, sell, create, migrate, and admin instructions require Ed25519 signer authorization. No Falcon, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, or Winternitz signature path exists at protocol or application level for PUMP.

• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs/blob/1059c0d9/docs/PUMP_PROGRAM_README.md
• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs/blob/1059c0d9/idl/pump.ts
• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography

Claim: All Solana accounts (including all PUMP holder addresses) use Ed25519 public keys directly as addresses. Every account that has signed a transaction has a long-exposure public key visible on-chain.

Coverage basis: Long-exposure Ed25519 public keys; inherited from Solana L1

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All Solana addresses are exposed Ed25519 public keys with no hash-based shielding; long-exposure attack surface for all active accounts

Assurance: Solana's address model is well-documented. Unlike Bitcoin's P2PKH, Solana has no unspent-address safety net.

Per Helius analysis: 'every externally owned account on Solana is, by default, Shor-vulnerable once a sufficiently powerful quantum machine exists. No unspent-address safety net exists here.' PUMP token has ~120K holders (CoinMarketCap) with exposed public keys.

• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography
• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana

Claim: Solana's Alpenglow consensus uses BLS12-381 signatures for validator votes and certificate aggregation. No PQC consensus path exists.

Coverage basis: BLS12-381; inherited from Solana L1

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Solana L1 consensus authentication uses BLS12-381 signatures (quantum-vulnerable)

Assurance: Jump Crypto notes that no practically deployable PQ analogue to BLS aggregation exists yet. LaBRADOR-based Falcon aggregation and STARK-based approaches are active research areas.

Consensus compromise is an L1 concern but directly affects PUMP transaction finality and settlement. This is inherited risk from Solana.

• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://www.anza.xyz/blog/securing-solana-against-a-powerful-quantum-adversary

Claim: Solana PDAs are hash-based (SHA-256) and quantum-safe by design. However, supply-binding (mint authorities), upgrade authorities, freeze authorities, and program admin controls all rely on Ed25519 signatures.

Coverage basis: Partial: PDAs are hash-based (quantum-safe); authority mechanisms are Ed25519 (quantum-vulnerable)

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: PDAs rely on SHA-256 second-preimage resistance which is not threatened by Grover's algorithm at practical scale. However, PDAs are controlled by Ed25519 authorities.

Pump.fun bonding curve state, global config, fee sharing configs, and creator vaults are all PDA-based (quantum-safe state binding). But their creation, update, and authority controls are Ed25519-signed (quantum-vulnerable). PUMP token mint authority, if not renounced, is Ed25519-based.

• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana
• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs/blob/1059c0d9/docs/PUMP_PROGRAM_README.md

Claim: Pump.fun has no privacy layer, shielded transactions, ZK proofs, or confidential transfer capabilities.

Coverage basis: N/A

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: Solana's P2P layer (Turbine/Rotor, Gossip, QUIC) uses Ed25519 for shred signing and node identity. No PQC P2P path exists.

Coverage basis: Ed25519; inherited from Solana L1

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: P2P transport is not directly spend-critical for PUMP tokens but affects network availability and censorship resistance. Recorded as score-reducing per QRI applicability rules.

Jump Crypto notes Turbine shred signing, Gossip, and QUIC all use Ed25519. PQ shred authentication requires Merkle-root signing or post-block verification approaches per Helius analysis.

• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography
• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana

Claim: No evidence that Pump.fun admin authorities, treasury, or protocol-controlled accounts use Blueshift Winterwallet, Winternitz Vaults, or any PQC signing path.

Coverage basis: No PQC wallet/custody adoption for Pump.fun

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Pump.fun admin authorities (global, fee, withdraw, set_creator) are Ed25519 keypairs with no evidence of PQC migration

Assurance: Blueshift Winterwallet exists on Solana mainnet as an opt-in PQC vault. No on-chain evidence indicates Pump.fun authorities have adopted it.

Pump.fun Global authority FFWtrEQ4B4PKQoVuHYzZq8FabGkVatYzDpEVHsK5rrhF is a standard Ed25519 account. All 7 fee_recipients, withdraw_authority, and admin_set_creator_authority are Ed25519 keys.

• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs/blob/1059c0d9/docs/PUMP_PROGRAM_README.md
• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana

Claim: 0% of PUMP token value-at-risk is protected by PQC. All ~$642M market cap (~$74M daily volume, ~120K holders) is secured only by Ed25519 signatures.

Coverage basis: 0% protected; ~$642M vulnerable

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: ~$642M PUMP market cap is entirely unprotected against quantum key-recovery attacks

Assurance: Market cap and volume figures from CoinMarketCap and CoinGecko as of 2026-06-05. Value-at-risk includes circulating supply (~353B PUMP) and protocol-controlled treasury/value pools.

PUMP is an active SPL token with significant daily volume. All value is held in Ed25519-secured accounts. No portion has been migrated to Winternitz Vaults or any PQC protection mechanism.

• https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/pump-fun/
• https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/pump-fun

Claim: No evidence that any Pump.fun critical wallet (global authority, fee recipients, withdraw authority, admin keys, treasury) has been migrated to PQC.

Coverage basis: No critical wallets migrated

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Pump.fun admin authorities are Ed25519 keypairs with no evidence of PQC migration

Assurance: Global authority, 7 fee_recipients, withdraw_authority, and admin_set_creator_authority are all identified as standard Ed25519 public keys in the Pump Program README. No on-chain evidence of Winterwallet or vault migration exists.

These authorities control protocol-wide configuration (fee parameters, creator assignment, migration logic). Compromise would enable systemic exploitation beyond individual holder accounts.

• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs/blob/1059c0d9/docs/PUMP_PROGRAM_README.md

Claim: Solana ecosystem has identified the quantum vulnerability of Ed25519 accounts. Pump.fun has not published any measurement, deprecation, freeze, or migration policy for its vulnerable value pools.

Coverage basis: Vulnerability identified at L1 level; no Pump.fun-specific measurement or policy

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Solana has identified the vulnerability class and proposed migration paths (seed-based ZK proofs, Winternitz vaults, Falcon migration). Pump.fun has not engaged with any of these.

Partial credit (0.25) for Solana-level vulnerability identification. No Pump.fun-specific legacy pool audit, freeze mechanism, deprecation timeline, or migration policy exists.

• https://solana.com/news/quantum-readiness
• https://www.anza.xyz/blog/securing-solana-against-a-powerful-quantum-adversary

Claim: Solana ecosystem has published research roadmaps for PQC migration (Falcon-512, SIMD-0461, seed-based ZK migration). Pump.fun has published no token-specific migration roadmap.

Coverage basis: Solana-level roadmap exists; no Pump.fun-specific roadmap

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Solana's roadmap is research-stage: 'Continue quantum research and keep evaluating Falcon, and its alternatives. If quantum becomes a credible threat, adopt a post-quantum scheme for new wallets. Migrate existing wallets.' (solana.com/news/quantum-readiness)

No Pump.fun-specific migration sequencing, activation criteria, or dependency mapping exists. The project relies entirely on Solana L1 migration when/if it occurs.

• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://solana.com/news/quantum-readiness
• https://www.anza.xyz/blog/securing-solana-against-a-powerful-quantum-adversary

Claim: Blueshift Winterwallet provides opt-in PQC vault on Solana mainnet. No default PQC account creation, wallet tooling, or migration prompts exist for PUMP token users or admins.

Coverage basis: Opt-in application-level vault only; no default or mandatory PQC path

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: operational/product caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Winterwallet works on Solana mainnet today (no protocol changes required) but is opt-in, one-time-use per vault, and has no Pump.fun-specific integration or promotion.

PUMP token holders could theoretically move funds to Winterwallet vaults, but there are no Pump.fun-provided migration prompts, UI integration, documentation, or incentives to do so.

• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms exist on Solana to deprecate Ed25519 signing, freeze vulnerable accounts, block unsafe fallback paths, or mandate PQC migration.

Coverage basis: No enforcement mechanisms

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Solana has no protocol-level mechanism to freeze, deprecate, or force-migrate vulnerable accounts. Pump.fun has no application-level mechanism either.

Per QRI §9.4.3, enforcement mechanisms include deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, or mandatory migration after a deadline. None exist for PUMP.

Claim: No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook, disclosure process, or emergency governance procedure exists for Pump.fun or Solana.

Coverage basis: No formal quantum IR process

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Per QRI §7.4, lack of a formal quantum-specific IR playbook is a note-only caveat when it does not leave a current quantum-vulnerable path unresolved. The vulnerability exists regardless of IR process maturity.

Solana's rapid upgrade cadence and validator coordination capability (demonstrated through regular feature activations) provide informal emergency response capacity but no quantum-specific playbook exists.

Claim: No PQC algorithms are used in production for PUMP token or Pump.fun protocol. Solana research targets Falcon-512 (FN-DSA, in NIST draft standardization) but this is not deployed.

Coverage basis: No production PQC; Falcon-512 is standards-track but not deployed

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Falcon-512 is on track for NIST FIPS 206 standardization. SIMD-0461 proposes a Falcon verification syscall but is not merged or activated.

Score is 0.00 because no PQC algorithm is used in production. Falcon selection is a research-stage decision, not a deployed protection.

• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/pull/461

Claim: No quantum-specific cryptographic audit exists for Pump.fun or its Solana dependencies. Pashov audit (2025-03-18) is scope-limited to smart-contract logic.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific audit

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Existing audits cover fixed-price-token-sale and pump-contracts-solana/pump-amm-2. They assess smart-contract logic correctness, not cryptographic primitive security or quantum resistance. This is recorded as an assurance-only caveat per QRI §6.5.

No independent review exists for Solana's Falcon implementation, Anza's migration proof, or Blueshift's Winternitz Vault as they apply to Pump.fun.

• https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Pump-security-review_2025-03-18.md
• https://github.com/pashov/audits/blob/master/team/md/Pump-security-review_2025-10-08.md

Claim: Solana PQC research prototypes (Falcon verification, migration proofs) are open-source. No Pump.fun-specific PQC implementation exists. Production Pump.fun code is open-source but uses only classical cryptography.

Coverage basis: Open-source PQC prototypes exist at Solana level; no Pump.fun PQC implementation

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Anza's migration proof prototype and Firedancer's Falcon verification implementation are open-source. Pump.fun program code is open-source but contains no PQC code.

Partial credit (0.25) for Solana-level open-source PQC prototypes. No Pump.fun-specific PQC implementation exists.

• https://github.com/anza-xyz/cryptography/pull/10
• https://github.com/pump-fun/pump-public-docs

Claim: Solana research documents parameter tradeoffs (Falcon vs Dilithium vs SQISign) and migration upgrade paths. Pump.fun has no documented upgrade path.

Coverage basis: Solana-level agility documentation exists; no Pump.fun-specific documentation

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Jump Crypto and Helius analyses document comparative scheme parameters. Solana's approach allows independent scheme selection for consensus vs transactions.

Partial credit for Solana-level documentation. Pump.fun has no documented plan for how it would coordinate admin key migration, upgrade its programs, or transition token holders.

• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography

Claim: Pump.fun does not use stateful signature schemes (XMSS/LMS). This subfactor is not applicable to the current production scope.

Coverage basis: N/A - no stateful signature scheme in use

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

If Solana were to adopt XMSS/LMS-style stateful signatures, this subfactor would become applicable. Currently it is N/A.

Claim: Solana research publications include performance analysis for Falcon-512 verification (~0.25x Ed25519 verify time), signature sizes (~666B vs 64B), and bandwidth implications.

Coverage basis: Solana-level performance analysis exists; no Pump.fun-specific analysis

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: Jump Crypto provides comparative table: Ed25519 (32B pk, 64B sig, 1.00x verify), Falcon-512 (897B pk, 666B sig, 0.25x verify), Dilithium2 (1312B pk, 2420B sig, 0.80x verify), SQIsign (65B pk, 148B sig, ~100x verify). Helius discusses Rotor/Turbine shred authentication PQ adaptations.

Partial credit for Solana-level analysis. No analysis exists for how PQ migration would affect Pump.fun bonding curve operations, fee calculations, or migration instruction costs.

• https://jumpcrypto.com/resources/quantum-migration-paths-for-solana
• https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-post-quantum-cryptography