blockchain network
Qubitcoin QTC
Qubitcoin (QTC) scores 5/100 on the Quantum Readiness Index, placing it at Stage 0 (Unassessed / No Evidence). The project is a Bitcoin Core fork whose 'quantum' branding refers exclusively to its Quantum Proof of Work (qPoW) consensus mechanism—miners simulate 16-qubit quantum circuits on GPUs as part of the block hashing process. This provides zero cryptographic protection against quantum attacks on transaction signatures. All spend authorization relies on classical ECDSA/secp256k1, inherited unchanged from Bitcoin and confirmed by the official wallet code (deterministic ECDSA per RFC 6979). The project has published no cryptographic inventory, no quantum threat model, no PQC migration plan, and has undergone no independent security audit. The state-integrity layer (SHA256 Merkle commitments) is quantum-safe, earning partial credit in Production Cryptographic Protection (4.04/35), but the critical spend-authorization layer is entirely quantum-vulnerable. Approximately 100% of on-chain value is held in ECDSA-secured addresses with no migration path. Secondary claims that Qubitcoin implements post-quantum transaction validation are contradicted by all primary sources and stem from confusion with a separate project (QubitCoin/QBTC by qubitcoin-finance, which does use ML-DSA-65 Dilithium). The QRI Score is capped at 5 by the Stage Cap for Stage 0.
Category breakdown
QRI Factors
Critical Quantum Blockers
- All transaction spend authorization uses classical ECDSA/secp256k1 with no PQC or hybrid-PQC alternative. A quantum attacker running Shor's algorithm can recover private keys from exposed public keys and steal all funds.
- No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model has been published by the project. The quantum vulnerability of ECDSA signatures is not acknowledged in any official documentation.
- No PQC migration roadmap, prototype, testnet, or design proposal exists. There is no path for users to protect funds from quantum key-recovery attacks.
- All account addresses follow standard Bitcoin address types (P2PKH, P2WPKH, P2TR, Bech32, SegWit). Public keys are exposed on-spend for P2PKH/P2WPKH and at-rest for P2PK outputs and reused addresses. Long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value exists with no mitigation, freeze, deprecation, or migration mechanism.
Key Risks
- QUANTUM-CRITICAL: All transaction signatures use ECDSA/secp256k1. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) running Shor's algorithm can recover private keys from public keys exposed during spending (P2PKH, P2WPKH) or already visible on-chain (P2PK outputs, reused addresses). This enables complete theft of all funds in quantum-vulnerable addresses.
- QUANTUM-CRITICAL: Public keys are exposed on-spend for all standard address types, creating a short-exposure attack window during transaction broadcast. For P2PK outputs and reused addresses, public keys are already on-chain, enabling offline at-rest attacks with no time constraint.
- QUANTUM-CRITICAL: No PQC migration path exists. Users cannot opt in to quantum-safe signatures, create PQ addresses, or migrate funds to quantum-resistant outputs. If a CRQC emerges, all QTC holders are defenseless.
- QUANTUM-CRITICAL UNCERTAINTY: The project has not published a cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model. The quantum vulnerability of ECDSA signatures is not acknowledged in any official documentation. The project's 'quantum' branding may mislead users into believing their funds are quantum-protected when they are not.
- ASSURANCE: No independent cryptographic audit has been performed. The codebase (forked from Bitcoin Core with qPoW modifications) has not been reviewed for quantum-specific vulnerabilities.
- OPERATIONAL: The project conflates quantum computing simulation (useful computation for PoW) with quantum cryptographic security. Users may incorrectly assume that qPoW provides protection against quantum attacks on their funds.
- CONFUSION RISK: A separate project named QubitCoin (QBTC, qubitcoin-finance) uses actual PQC (ML-DSA-65/Dilithium). Exchanges, data aggregators, and users may confuse QTC with QBTC, leading to incorrect quantum-safety assumptions.
Assurance Notes
- The project's 'quantum' branding (Quantum Proof of Work, qPoW) refers exclusively to quantum circuit simulation in the mining/consensus layer. It provides zero cryptographic quantum resistance for transaction signatures, ownership, or spend authorization.
- No independent cryptographic audit exists for Qubitcoin. CertiK confirms the project has not been audited by CertiK or any third party.
- The project has no published quantum threat model, cryptographic inventory, or quantum risk assessment. The quantum vulnerability of ECDSA/secp256k1 transaction signatures is not acknowledged in any official project documentation.
- Secondary sources (e.g., CoinEx academy article) incorrectly claim QTC implements post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for transaction validation. This claim is contradicted by all primary sources (source code, official documentation, wallet code). The author appears to have conflated QTC with a different project (QubitCoin/QBTC by qubitcoin-finance, which does use ML-DSA-65 Dilithium).
- The qubitcoin-coinbin web wallet and qubitcoin-electrum wallet both confirm exclusive use of ECDSA/secp256k1 signatures (deterministic per RFC 6979). No PQC signature support exists in any user-facing wallet.
Non-Scoring Caveats
- Qubitcoin's 'Quantum Proof of Work' (qPoW) is a consensus-layer innovation for mining that simulates 16-qubit quantum circuits on GPUs. It is unrelated to post-quantum cryptographic security and provides zero protection against quantum key-recovery attacks on transaction signatures.
- The project's roadmap mentions 'Superdense Consensus' (multi-task PoW) and quantum circuit optimization tools. Neither addresses the quantum vulnerability of ECDSA transaction signatures.
- A separate project named QubitCoin (QBTC, qubitcoin-finance) uses actual PQC (ML-DSA-65/Dilithium). Exchanges, data aggregators, and users may confuse QTC with QBTC, leading to incorrect quantum-safety assumptions.
- The project is tagged 'Quantum-Resistant' on some third-party sites (e.g., isthiscoinascam.com). This tagging is misleading and not supported by primary evidence.
- No formal performance benchmarks, side-channel analysis, or resource-impact assessment exist for the current (classical) or any future PQC implementation.
Evidence record
Claims and Caveats
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public cryptographic inventory and quantum threat model
Claim: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model has been published by the project.
Coverage basis: The project has not published any document identifying its cryptographic mechanisms, their quantum vulnerability, affected assets, or attack assumptions.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model has been published. The quantum vulnerability of ECDSA/secp256k1 transaction signatures is not acknowledged in any official documentation.
Assurance: Evidence is strong that no inventory exists: the official website, GitHub README, and blog posts discuss only qPoW mining and quantum simulation. No document addresses cryptographic quantum risk.
The project's official documentation focuses entirely on qPoW (quantum circuit simulation for mining). The word 'quantum' in project materials refers to quantum computing as a computational resource for PoW, not to quantum-resistant cryptography.
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public evidence record supporting quantum risk assessment
Claim: No public evidence record supports a quantum risk assessment because no assessment has been published.
Coverage basis: No code references, specs, audits, transaction examples, or reproducible analytics addressing quantum vulnerability have been published by the project.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No quantum risk assessment or supporting evidence record has been published.
Assurance: The absence of any risk assessment documentation across all official channels (website, GitHub, blog, Bitcointalk ANN) is clearly verifiable.
While evaluators can derive the cryptographic inventory from public source code, the project itself has not performed or published this work.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Spend authorization / transaction signatures
Claim: All transaction signatures use classical ECDSA/secp256k1. No PQC or hybrid-PQC signature support exists.
Coverage basis: Qubitcoin is a Bitcoin Core fork. Bitcoin's ECDSA/secp256k1 signature scheme is inherited unchanged. The qubitcoin-coinbin wallet explicitly states signatures are deterministic per RFC 6979 (ECDSA).
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: All spend authorization uses ECDSA/secp256k1. Shor's algorithm on a CRQC can recover private keys from exposed public keys, enabling complete theft.
Assurance: Multiple independent primary sources confirm ECDSA-only signatures: the Bitcoin Core inheritance, the qubitcoin-coinbin wallet README (RFC 6979 deterministic ECDSA), and the qubitcoin-electrum wallet (libsecp256k1 dependency). No source code or documentation suggests any PQC signature integration.
The CoinEx academy article (2025-08-08) claiming PQC transaction validation is contradicted by all primary sources and represents confusion with a different project (QBTC by qubitcoin-finance).
Production Cryptographic Protection
Account/address/public-key exposure and key-derivation design
Claim: Standard Bitcoin address types expose public keys on-spend (P2PKH, P2WPKH) or at-rest (P2PK, reused addresses, P2TR key-path). No PQ/hybrid controls exist to prevent long-exposure quantum-vulnerable ownership paths.
Coverage basis: Qubitcoin inherits Bitcoin's address model: P2PKH, P2WPKH, P2TR (Taproot), Bech32, SegWit. Public keys are revealed during spending for hash-based addresses and are permanently visible for P2PK outputs and key-path Taproot.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Public keys are exposed on-spend for all address types and permanently on-chain for P2PK outputs and reused addresses. Long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value can be attacked offline with no time constraint.
Assurance: The address model is verifiable from the Bitcoin codebase, the qubitcoin-coinbin wallet (supports SegWit, Bech32, HD BIP32), and the mainnet explorer.
P2PKH and P2WPKH addresses provide short-exposure (on-spend) attack windows. P2PK outputs, reused addresses, and P2TR key-path outputs create long-exposure (at-rest) attack surfaces—the most immediate quantum risk profile.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Consensus-critical authentication (validator signatures, VRFs, randomness, threshold signatures, block certificates)
Claim: Qubitcoin uses Proof-of-Work consensus (qPoW + SHA256/SHA3). There are no validator signatures, BLS threshold signatures, VRFs, randomness beacons, or finality signatures.
Coverage basis: As a PoW Bitcoin fork, consensus is achieved through proof-of-work, not through validator authentication. The qPoW mechanism adds quantum circuit simulation to the hashing process but does not introduce validator signatures.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The PoW architecture is clearly documented in the GitHub README and Bitcointalk announcement. The qPoW mechanism (quantum circuit simulation + SHA256/SHA3) is a PoW variant, not a validator signature scheme.
SHA256 is considered quantum-resistant for preimage resistance (Grover's algorithm provides O(2^128) for 256-bit hash, still infeasible). SHA3 is similarly quantum-safe.
Production Cryptographic Protection
State-integrity and data-availability mechanisms (commitments, script authorization, supply-binding, KZG/pairings, bridge verification)
Claim: State integrity relies on SHA256 Merkle tree commitments (quantum-safe) and ECDSA-based script authorization (quantum-vulnerable). No KZG/pairing-based commitments or bridge verification exist.
Coverage basis: SHA256 Merkle tree provides quantum-safe state commitment (Grover's algorithm gives O(2^128) preimage security). Script authorization uses ECDSA/secp256k1 signature verification, which is quantum-vulnerable. Supply is enforced by consensus rules (block subsidy schedule), not cryptographic commitment.
Implementation score: 0.5 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: ECDSA-based script authorization allows quantum-enabled forgery of state transitions. A quantum attacker can forge signatures to spend any UTXO.
Assurance: SHA256 quantum safety for commitment schemes is well-established. The ECDSA vulnerability in script authorization is inherited from Bitcoin and is verifiable from source code.
The SHA256 commitment structure (Merkle tree, block hash chain) is genuinely quantum-safe, earning partial credit. However, script authorization via ECDSA signature verification creates a quantum-vulnerable state-validation path that overlaps with the spend-authorization vulnerability.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Privacy and proof layers (ZK proof assumptions, note encryption, viewing keys, shielded state)
Claim: Qubitcoin has no privacy layer, no shielded transactions, no ZK proofs, no note encryption, and no stealth address protocol beyond basic Bitcoin-style functionality.
Coverage basis: Qubitcoin is a transparent Bitcoin fork. No privacy-specific cryptographic mechanisms exist.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The absence of any privacy layer is verifiable from the codebase and documentation.
Production Cryptographic Protection
P2P transport, node identity, and peer authentication
Claim: P2P networking uses Bitcoin's classical P2P protocol. Node identity and peer authentication rely on classical cryptography.
Coverage basis: The P2P layer is inherited from Bitcoin Core. It uses classical cryptographic mechanisms for transport and node identity.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: P2P compromise in a PoW chain does not directly enable asset theft, signature forgery, or consensus corruption. It is primarily a denial-of-service and eclipse-attack vector. The subfactor is scored but does not create a quantum-critical blocker for asset security.
While the P2P layer is not quantum-safe, the primary quantum threat to asset security is in spend authorization, not P2P transport. P2P attacks could enable transaction censorship or network disruption but not private key recovery.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Critical wallet, custody, HSM, signer, and hardware-wallet workflows
Claim: All official wallets (qubitcoin-coinbin web wallet, qubitcoin-electrum desktop wallet) use ECDSA/secp256k1 exclusively. No PQ/hybrid signing path exists in any wallet or custody workflow.
Coverage basis: The qubitcoin-coinbin wallet explicitly states deterministic ECDSA signatures per RFC 6979. The qubitcoin-electrum wallet depends on libsecp256k1. No wallet supports PQC signatures.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: All official wallets use ECDSA exclusively. No PQ/hybrid signing path exists. Users cannot protect funds even if they want to.
Assurance: Wallet code is publicly available on GitHub and clearly shows ECDSA-only signature support.
The qubitcoin-coinbin wallet supports standard Bitcoin features: Multisig, Stealth, HD (BIP32), SegWit, Bech32—all built on ECDSA/secp256k1 key material.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Percentage of economically relevant value-at-risk protected from quantum key-recovery attacks
Claim: Approximately 0% of on-chain value is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. All QTC is held in ECDSA/secp256k1-secured addresses.
Coverage basis: No PQC address format, no hybrid signature scheme, and no migration has occurred. All circulating supply (~2.23M QTC self-reported, ~$3M market cap per CoinMarketCap) is in quantum-vulnerable addresses.
Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: 100% of on-chain value is quantum-vulnerable with no migration path. Coverage is effectively 0%.
Assurance: Coverage cannot be precisely measured through the block explorer alone, but the absence of any PQC address format or migration mechanism makes 0% protection the only reasonable estimate. Market cap and supply figures are from CoinMarketCap (self-reported).
Per 9.3.1 coverage thresholds, <25% coverage earns a score of 1 out of 20 for this subfactor (Implementation Score = 0.05). The project has no PQC protection whatsoever.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Critical wallets migrated, protected, or inherently PQ-native
Claim: No critical wallets have migrated to PQC or are protected. All wallets—including any treasury, exchange, or foundation-controlled addresses—use ECDSA/secp256k1.
Coverage basis: No evidence of any PQ-protected wallet, treasury, custodian, or exchange address exists. The protocol provides no mechanism for PQ wallet creation.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No critical wallets are quantum-protected. Treasury, exchange, and large-holder addresses are as vulnerable as any user address.
Assurance: The absence of any PQ wallet infrastructure is clearly verifiable. However, specific treasury/foundation addresses are not publicly identified, so large-holder exposure is inferred from the protocol design rather than measured directly.
The project does not publicly identify treasury, foundation, or team-controlled addresses. All addresses on the network use the same ECDSA-based security model.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Legacy vulnerable pools/accounts/UTXOs/contracts identified, measurable, deprecated, migrated, frozen, or proven not to exist by design
Claim: No legacy vulnerable pools have been identified, measured, deprecated, or addressed. All UTXOs are quantum-vulnerable by default, and no mechanism exists to distinguish or handle them.
Coverage basis: The project has not published any analysis of quantum-vulnerable UTXOs, address reuse patterns, or exposed public keys. No deprecation, freeze, or migration mechanism exists.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No identification, measurement, or deprecation of quantum-vulnerable UTXOs has occurred. P2PK outputs and reused addresses with exposed public keys cannot be distinguished or protected.
Assurance: The Bitcoin-style UTXO model means P2PK outputs and reused-address UTXOs have permanently exposed public keys. The project has not attempted to inventory or address these.
Even if the project were to add PQC signature support in the future, legacy UTXOs with exposed public keys (P2PK, reused addresses) would remain quantum-vulnerable without a specific deprecation, burn, or migration policy.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Public migration or protection roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, and dependencies
Claim: No public PQC migration or quantum-protection roadmap exists. The project's roadmap focuses on quantum simulation improvements (Superdense Consensus, rmsynth) and does not address transaction signature migration.
Coverage basis: The published roadmap (Bitcointalk ANN, GitHub) mentions Superdense Consensus, quantum simulator optimization, and custom wallets. No PQC signature migration is mentioned.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No PQC migration roadmap exists. The project's roadmap addresses quantum simulation for PoW, not quantum-resistant transaction signatures.
Assurance: The absence of any PQC migration content across all official channels is clearly verifiable.
The project's 'quantum' focus is on using quantum computing as a computational resource (quantum simulation for PoW), not on defending against quantum attacks on cryptography.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration accessibility and defaults (PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, migration prompts)
Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user warnings, education, or migration prompts exist.
Coverage basis: All wallet software (qubitcoin-coinbin, qubitcoin-electrum, qubitcoin-cli) supports only classical ECDSA address creation and signing. No PQ options exist.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No PQ account creation, wallet support, or user-facing migration tools exist. Users cannot opt in to quantum-safe transaction signing.
Assurance: Wallet code publicly available confirms ECDSA-only support.
Users are given no warnings about quantum vulnerability. The 'quantum' branding may create a false sense of security.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration enforcement and coordination (deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, exchange/custody/bridge coordination)
Claim: No migration enforcement mechanisms exist. Legacy ECDSA signing is the only available path. No coordination with exchanges, custodians, or bridges has been evidenced.
Coverage basis: No deprecation schedule, freeze mechanism, legacy-signing disablement, withdrawal restrictions, or unsafe-path blocking exists. No exchange or custody coordination has been documented.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No enforcement mechanisms exist. ECDSA-only signing is the default and only path with no restrictions.
Assurance: The absence of any enforcement mechanism is clearly verifiable from the codebase and documentation.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process for quantum-related vulnerabilities
Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process has been published.
Coverage basis: The project's SECURITY.md and documentation contain no quantum-specific incident response procedures. No security contact or disclosure process for quantum vulnerabilities is identified.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: While the absence of a quantum-specific incident-response playbook is notable, it does not independently create a quantum-attack path. The primary blockers are the absence of PQC signatures and migration infrastructure.
The SECURITY.md file in the repository is the standard Bitcoin Core security policy and does not address quantum-specific threats.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Uses NIST-standardized, standards-track, or broadly reviewed PQC/hybrid-PQC algorithms appropriate to the use case
Claim: No NIST-standardized or broadly reviewed PQC algorithms are used. The only signature scheme is ECDSA/secp256k1, which is quantum-vulnerable.
Coverage basis: The codebase contains no references to ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), FN-DSA (Falcon), or any other PQC algorithm. Only ECDSA/secp256k1 is implemented.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No NIST-standardized PQC algorithms are used. ECDSA/secp256k1 is the only signature scheme.
Assurance: The absence of any PQC algorithm is clearly verifiable from the source code across all repositories.
SHA256 (used for mining and state commitments) is quantum-safe for preimage resistance but does not address the signature vulnerability.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Independent cryptographic and implementation audit for the quantum-critical scope
Claim: No independent cryptographic or implementation audit has been performed for any component of Qubitcoin.
Coverage basis: CertiK confirms the project has not been audited by CertiK or any third party. No audit reports are linked from the project website, GitHub, or any secondary source.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: The absence of any audit is confirmed by CertiK's project insight page, which shows 'Not Audited By CertiK' and '3rd Party Audit: No'. Even if an audit existed, it would only cover the current classical implementation, not any future PQC migration.
The qPoW mining component has not been independently reviewed for correctness or security. The cryptographic components inherited from Bitcoin Core have undergone extensive community review over many years, but the Qubitcoin-specific modifications (qPoW) have not been independently audited.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Open-source, reproducible implementation
Claim: The Qubitcoin codebase is open-source (MIT License) on GitHub, but there is no PQC implementation to be open-source or reproducible.
Coverage basis: The code is publicly available on GitHub under MIT License. However, the quantum-critical scope (PQC signature implementation) does not exist to be open-source.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: The classical codebase is open-source, which is positive for transparency. However, the subfactor concerns the quantum-critical (PQC) implementation, which does not exist.
The classical ECDSA implementation inherited from Bitcoin Core is open-source and has undergone years of community review, but this does not constitute a PQC implementation.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Parameter agility and future upgrade path documented
Claim: No parameter agility or PQC upgrade path is documented. There is no discussion of how the protocol would transition to new cryptographic algorithms.
Coverage basis: No documentation addresses cryptographic agility, algorithm upgrade procedures, or transition planning for quantum-resistant signatures.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No parameter agility or cryptographic upgrade path is documented. The protocol has no mechanism for transitioning to PQC signatures.
Assurance: The absence of any upgrade-path documentation is clearly verifiable.
The Superdense Consensus multi-task PoW architecture could theoretically support adding new cryptographic tasks, but this is not documented as a PQC migration path and does not address signature scheme migration.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Stateful-signature safety (XMSS/LMS anti-reuse controls, signing-state discipline, hardware-wallet/HSM considerations)
Claim: No stateful signature schemes (XMSS, LMS, SPHINCS+) are used. The only signature scheme is stateless ECDSA.
Coverage basis: Qubitcoin uses only stateless ECDSA/secp256k1 signatures. Stateful signature safety considerations are not applicable.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: The exclusive use of stateless ECDSA is confirmed by source code analysis.
If the project were to adopt XMSS/LMS in a future PQC migration, stateful-signature safety would become an important consideration.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Performance and resource-impact analysis for PQ signature/verification costs
Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis exists for PQC signature schemes in the Qubitcoin context.
Coverage basis: No documentation, benchmarks, or analysis addresses the impact of PQC signature sizes, verification costs, block validation overhead, mempool policy changes, or archival growth.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: The absence of any PQC performance analysis is clearly verifiable. This is scored because no PQC implementation exists, making performance analysis moot. If PQC were implemented, this would become a critical assurance factor given the large signature sizes of ML-DSA (3,293 bytes) and SLH-DSA.
PQC signatures like ML-DSA-65 produce ~3,293-byte signatures (vs ECDSA's ~71 bytes). In a UTXO blockchain, this would significantly impact transaction size, block capacity, mempool memory, and archival storage. No analysis of these impacts exists.
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