USD1 USD1

Claim: USD1 has not published any cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific assessment exists; classical implementation is publicly verifiable.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: cap-applying

Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory (Readiness & Risk Cap: max QRI 10)

Assurance: Classical implementation is fully verifiable from open-source code and verified contracts. No quantum-specific documentation exists anywhere in the project's published materials.

USD1 is not PQ-native; it launched as a classical ERC-20 token. Section 7.1 does not apply. A cryptographic inventory and threat model are prerequisites for any quantum-migration planning.

• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/
• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts

Claim: No quantum-focused evidence record exists. Classical contracts are verified on Etherscan and open-source on GitHub.

Coverage basis: Classical code is public; no quantum evidence artifacts exist.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: cap-applying

Assurance: Classical implementation evidence is strong. No quantum-relevant code, specs, test vectors, or mainnet PQ transactions exist.

Project provides standard DeFi documentation and verified contracts but zero quantum-preparedness evidence.

• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d

Claim: All USD1 transfers rely on host-chain transaction signatures: ECDSA on Ethereum/BNB Chain, EdDSA on Solana. No PQ or hybrid path exists.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain signature scheme; no independent signature mechanism.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All on-chain spend authorization is entirely ECDSA/EdDSA-only via host chains (Readiness & Risk Cap: max QRI 40)

Assurance: Verified from on-chain contract code and host-chain protocol specifications. No ambiguity: USD1 uses standard ERC-20/BEP-20/SPL transfer functions with no custom signature verification.

As a standard smart-contract token, USD1 inherently shares the base-layer QRI score of each host chain for transaction signatures per Section 7.2. All host chains (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Solana, Tron) use classical signatures in production.

• https://etherscan.io/token/0x8d0d000ee44948fc98c9b98a4fa4921476f08b0d
• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts

Claim: USD1 users interact via standard host-chain accounts. Ethereum EOAs expose public keys on spend, creating long-exposure quantum-vulnerable ownership paths. No PQ/hybrid address schemes or key-derivation controls exist.

Coverage basis: Inherits host-chain account model with no PQ modifications.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Public-key exposure on Ethereum is well-documented: any EOA that has sent a transaction exposes its public key indefinitely. ~810K holders and ~50M transactions represent large long-exposure surface.

Long-exposure attack window applies. Every Ethereum EOA that has transferred USD1 has a publicly visible public key that can be attacked offline by a future quantum computer. BNB Chain shares the same ECDSA model. Solana EdDSA keys are also quantum-vulnerable.

• https://etherscan.io/token/0x8d0d000ee44948fc98c9b98a4fa4921476f08b0d
• https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/usd1-wlfi

Claim: USD1 is a token without its own consensus mechanism. Consensus security is inherited from host chains.

Coverage basis: N/A for a token.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: USD1 state integrity depends on host-chain state plus Chainlink CCIP bridge verification (classical signatures) and upgradeable proxy admin (classical multisig). No quantum-safe proof systems, commitments, or bridge verification exist.

Coverage basis: Bridge verification and admin-key upgrade path are token-specific quantum-vulnerable surfaces.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Chainlink CCIP bridge and proxy admin rely on classical signatures; quantum compromise of either could break token state integrity (unauthorized minting or contract upgrade)

Assurance: Chainlink has published quantum-safe cryptography articles and roadmap content, but CCIP production oracle networks currently use classical signatures. The proxy admin is a Gnosis Safe multisig—classical ECDSA-secured.

The upgradeable proxy pattern means a quantum attacker compromising admin signers could replace the token implementation with a malicious contract. The CCIP bridge signer set compromise could allow cross-chain minting of unbacked USD1. Both represent state-integrity failure paths.

• https://defiway.com/
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d
• https://chain.link/article/quantum-safe-cryptography

Claim: USD1 has no privacy features, shielded transactions, ZK proofs, or confidential transfer mechanisms.

Coverage basis: N/A for a transparent stablecoin.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: USD1 is a token without its own P2P network. All P2P communication is handled by host-chain nodes.

Coverage basis: N/A for a token.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: BitGo production custody and mint/redemption workflows use classical MPC. A PQ MPC simulation was completed in May 2026 but is not in production. No PQ wallet support exists for end users or institutional custodians.

Coverage basis: Custody infrastructure is production-classical; PQ is simulation-only.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: BitGo production custody uses classical MPC; PQ MPC is simulation-only and does not protect current reserves or minting keys

Assurance: The BitGo/Silence Laboratories PQ MPC simulation (May 2026) uses NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and is a credible Stage 2 development activity. However, the press release explicitly states it is a simulation for development/testing, not a production deployment. Current production custody of USD1 reserves remains classically secured.

BitGo's PQ MPC development is the only quantum-relevant activity in the USD1 ecosystem. It represents a custody-layer Stage 2 signal but does not change the project's QRI Score since it does not yet protect any production assets.

• https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260526229210/en/BitGo-and-Silence-Laboratories-Complete-First-Post-Quantum-MPC-Transaction-Simulation-by-a-Regulated-Custodian
• https://www.bitgo.com/usd1/

Claim: 0% of circulating USD1 supply is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. All tokens are controlled by classical ECDSA/EdDSA keys on host chains. No migration, freeze, or protection mechanism exists.

Coverage basis: Coverage is <25%; score per table 9.3.1.

Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Market cap and circulating supply are publicly verifiable from CoinMarketCap, CoinGecko, and on-chain data. ~$4.4B in fully exposed value represents one of the largest quantum-vulnerable stablecoin surfaces.

Coverage is effectively 0%. Every on-chain USD1 token is controlled by a classical host-chain key. There is no PQ account type, no hybrid signature support, and no migration path for any holder. The BitGo PQ MPC simulation does not change on-chain token protection status.

• https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/usd1/
• https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/usd1-wlfi
• https://etherscan.io/token/0x8d0d000ee44948fc98c9b98a4fa4921476f08b0d

Claim: No critical wallets (WLFI treasury, BitGo custody, proxy admin multisig, exchange wallets, bridge contracts) are PQ-protected. All rely on classical ECDSA/EdDSA keys or classical MPC.

Coverage basis: All critical wallets are classically secured.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Proxy admin (Gnosis Safe multisig), TokenGovernor (3-of-6 multisig), and guardian EOA are all classical-key-controlled; quantum compromise could enable unlimited minting or global fund freezing

Assurance: The proxy admin address appears to be a Gnosis Safe multisig based on on-chain analysis. The Justin Sun controversy revealed a guardian EOA with unilateral freeze authority and a 3-of-5 (or 3-of-6 per Aave) multisig for governance. All are classically secured.

Binance holds ~92% of USD1 supply (per Aave governance review, late 2025). Binance's custody infrastructure is not publicly documented as PQ-protected for hot/operational wallets.

• https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d
• https://www.bitgo.com/usd1/

Claim: No identification, measurement, deprecation, freeze, burn, or migration mechanism exists for quantum-vulnerable USD1 accounts. No policy addresses unmigratable quantum-vulnerable value.

Coverage basis: No legacy-pool management exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No documentation, proposal, or on-chain mechanism addresses quantum-vulnerable account identification or remediation. The freeze function exists in the contract but is designed for compliance/sanctions, not quantum-migration purposes.

The contract does have a freeze capability (per Aave review and Justin Sun controversy), but it has been used for compliance/administrative purposes, not quantum-risk management. No quantum-specific freeze or migration policy exists.

• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/

Claim: No public quantum-migration roadmap exists for USD1. BitGo's PQ MPC development is a custody-level activity, not a published USD1 token migration plan.

Coverage basis: No roadmap exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BitGo's PQ MPC simulation press release mentions 'planning to continue developing and testing' but does not constitute a published USD1 migration roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, or dependencies.

USD1 is not PQ-native per Section 7.1; it launched as a classical ERC-20 token. A migration roadmap is a prerequisite for any quantum-readiness progression.

• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/
• https://worldlibertyfinancial.com/

Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist for USD1.

Coverage basis: No migration tooling exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: USD1's user-facing documentation covers standard stablecoin operations (minting, redemption, DeFi integration) with zero quantum-security content. No wallet supports PQ-signing for USD1 transactions since no host chain supports it.

Migration accessibility is fundamentally constrained by host-chain limitations. Even if USD1 wanted to support PQ transactions, it cannot do so independently of Ethereum/BNB Chain/Solana protocol upgrades.

• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/
• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms, deprecation schedules, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, or exchange/custody coordination exist for quantum migration.

Coverage basis: No migration enforcement exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: No public coordination with exchanges (Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, etc.), custodians, wallet providers, or bridge operators for quantum migration has been documented.

The multi-chain deployment across 10+ networks makes coordination particularly complex. Each host chain has its own quantum-readiness trajectory, and USD1 has no published strategy for handling divergent chain-level migration timelines.

Claim: No public quantum-specific incident-response process, disclosure policy, or emergency governance mechanism exists for USD1 or WLFI.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific IR process.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: While the absence of a quantum-specific IR playbook is an operational gap, it does not independently create a quantum vulnerability. The contract does have emergency pause and freeze capabilities for general incident response, but these are not quantum-specific.

The existing emergency pause and freeze mechanisms are controlled by classical keys, meaning they could themselves be compromised in a quantum attack scenario. A quantum-specific IR process would need to address this circular dependency.

• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/

Claim: No PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms are used anywhere in the USD1 stack. BitGo's PQ MPC simulation uses NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) but is not in production.

Coverage basis: No production PQC algorithms exist.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: BitGo's simulated PQ MPC uses ML-DSA (FIPS 204), which is a NIST-standardized PQC signature algorithm. This is positive for future custody readiness but earns zero points since it is not protecting production assets.

The BitGo/Silence Labs PQ MPC simulation represents credible algorithm selection (NIST-standardized) for custody-layer development. If/when deployed in production for USD1 reserve custody, this subfactor would warrant re-evaluation.

• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts
• https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260526229210/en/BitGo-and-Silence-Laboratories-Complete-First-Post-Quantum-MPC-Transaction-Simulation-by-a-Regulated-Custodian

Claim: No quantum-specific cryptographic audit exists. Peckshield audited classical ERC-20 implementation. BitGo PQ MPC simulation has no public independent audit.

Coverage basis: Classical audit exists; no quantum-scope audit.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Peckshield audit is reported to exist and found no critical vulnerabilities in classical contract logic, but the full audit report is not publicly available (per Aave governance review). The audit scope covers classical ERC-20 security, not quantum-resistance. No quantum-specific audit has been commissioned or published.

With no PQC implementation, there is nothing quantum-specific to audit. This subfactor would become applicable for scoring once a PQ/hybrid implementation exists.

• https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-onboard-usd1-to-aave-v3-core-and-bnb-instance/22589

Claim: Classical smart contracts are open-source on GitHub and verified on Etherscan. No PQC implementation exists to be open-source.

Coverage basis: Classical code is open-source; no PQ code exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Classical code quality and reproducibility are good: contracts are verified, buildable with Foundry, and well-structured. This supports future auditability but does not contribute to quantum-readiness since no PQ implementation exists.

The subfactor measures open-source availability of the quantum-critical implementation. Since there is no PQ implementation, there is nothing to evaluate. Scored 0.00 accordingly.

• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts
• https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d0D000Ee44948FC98c9B98A4FA4921476f08B0d#code

Claim: No documented quantum-specific parameter agility. The upgradeable proxy pattern enables contract upgrades but is not documented for cryptographic agility purposes.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific agility documentation.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The TransparentUpgradeableProxy pattern technically allows implementation upgrades, but there is no documentation describing how this could be used for cryptographic migration, algorithm rotation, or hybrid-PQC rollout. The admin key structure adds governance complexity to any future agility plan.

Parameter agility for a token is largely constrained by host-chain capabilities. USD1 cannot independently upgrade transaction signature algorithms without host-chain protocol changes. Governance-key agility (e.g., rotating the proxy admin to a PQ multisig) would be a token-level agility concern.

• https://github.com/worldliberty/usd1-smart-contracts
• https://docs.worldlibertyfinancial.com/

Claim: No stateful signature schemes (XMSS/LMS) are used in the USD1 stack.

Coverage basis: N/A for a classical-only implementation.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Claim: No PQ performance analysis exists for USD1 token operations or for BitGo's PQ MPC simulation in production context.

Coverage basis: No performance analysis exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: confidence-only

Assurance: BitGo's PQ MPC simulation press release does not include performance benchmarks, latency measurements, or resource-impact analysis. For a stablecoin with ~50M transactions and multi-chain deployment, PQ signature size and verification cost analysis would be important for migration planning.

This is scored 0.00 because no performance analysis exists, but it is classified as an assurance-only caveat since the absence of a benchmark does not independently create a quantum vulnerability in the current classical system. It would become more material during migration planning.