stablecoin
USDD USDD
USDD is a ~$1.4B market-cap stablecoin deployed as a standard TRC-20/ERC-20/BEP-20 token across TRON, Ethereum, and BNB Chain. It inherits the quantum vulnerability of all three host chains, each of which uses ECDSA secp256k1 for transaction signatures with no post-quantum protection in production. Additionally, USDD's minting authority, collateral custody, and protocol governance are controlled by the TRON DAO Reserve through a 5-of-7 multisig and classical admin contracts (DSPauseProxy, GovActionsProxy)—all secured by quantum-vulnerable ECDSA keys. Compromise of these keys would enable unlimited minting, collateral extraction, and protocol destruction. TRON announced a PQC initiative in April 2026, but as of the evaluation date no formal proposal, code, testnet, or documentation exists. USDD itself has published no cryptographic inventory, quantum risk assessment, or migration plan. QRI Score: 1/100 (Stage 0).
Not AssessedECC-OnlyToken Inherits Host Chain RiskRoadmap Only (TRON host chain)Centralized Governance Risk
Category breakdown
QRI Factors
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
0 / 20
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
0 / 15
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
1 / 25
Production Cryptographic Protection
0 / 35
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
0 / 5
Critical Quantum Blockers
- Active production spend authorization and token admin/governance keys remain entirely ECC-only (ECDSA secp256k1) across all host chains (TRON, Ethereum, BNB Chain). Cap: 40.
- No public cryptographic inventory or quantum risk assessment exists for the protocol. Cap: 10.
- Material long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value (~$1.4B circulating across all chains) exists with no migration, freeze, deprecation, burn, or recovery path. Cap: 55.
Key Risks
- Host-chain quantum vulnerability: All three host chains (TRON, Ethereum, BNB Chain) use ECDSA-only spend authorization. A quantum adversary capable of running Shor's algorithm could recover private keys from exposed public keys and drain any USDD balance held in a transacted account.
- Admin key compromise: The TRON DAO Reserve controls USDD minting, collateral, and protocol parameters via a 5-of-7 ECDSA multisig. Quantum compromise of 5 of 7 signer keys would grant full control over USDD supply, collateral reserves, and protocol configuration.
- Cross-chain attack surface: USDD circulates on TRON (~$1.14B), Ethereum (~$270M), and BNB Chain (~$16M) through bridge contracts. A quantum attack on any host chain's bridge or admin contracts could disrupt cross-chain parity, enable double-spend minting, or drain bridge reserves.
- No migration path: There is no mechanism for USDD holders, the TDR multisig, or protocol governance to migrate to quantum-resistant cryptography. If Q-Day arrives before migration infrastructure exists, all ~$1.4B in USDD value is at immediate risk with no recourse.
- Governance centralization amplifies quantum risk: The decommissioning of the DAO governance portal means all protocol authority is concentrated in a small set of ECDSA keys. This reduces the attack surface for quantum adversaries to as few as 5 keys (the multisig threshold).
- No quantum risk acknowledgment: USDD's official documentation, whitepaper, and public communications contain zero mention of quantum computing threats, cryptographic vulnerabilities, or migration planning.
Assurance Notes
- USDD is a standard smart-contract token (TRC20, ERC20, BEP20) deployed across TRON, Ethereum, and BNB Chain, inheriting the quantum-vulnerable ECDSA secp256k1 cryptography of all three host networks.
- USDD V2 governance and admin keys (e.g., DSPauseProxy, GovActionsProxy, TRON DAO Reserve 5-of-7 multisig) rely on classical ECDSA signatures, exposing minting authority and collateral management to quantum key-recovery attacks.
- No public cryptographic inventory, quantum threat model, or post-quantum migration roadmap has been published by the TRON DAO Reserve or USDD developers.
- USDD V2 smart contracts have been audited by ChainSecurity and SlowMist, but these audits address classical smart-contract security only and do not cover quantum-critical cryptographic scope. No quantum-specific audit exists.
- TRON announced a post-quantum cryptography initiative on April 15, 2026 (testnet Q2 2026, mainnet Q3 2026), naming NIST standards ML-DSA, FN-DSA, and SLH-DSA. As of the evaluation date (June 6, 2026), no formal governance proposal, technical documentation, public code, or testnet has been released. This is a declaration of intent, not production protection.
- USDD is undergoing a migration to USDD 2.0 (contract upgrade). This is unrelated to quantum migration and does not address cryptographic vulnerabilities.
- The TRON DAO Reserve governance portal (DAO voting) has been decommissioned, and USDD governance is effectively centralized under TDR control via a 5-of-7 multisig.
- USDD has cross-chain bridge dependencies (BitTorrent Chain, Stargate, Symbiosis, Debridge). No quantum assessment of bridge security exists.
- No formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook, security contact for quantum disclosures, or quantum threat model exists for USDD.
Non-Scoring Caveats
- TRON announced a PQC roadmap on April 15, 2026, with testnet Q2 2026 and mainnet Q3 2026. As of June 6, 2026, this has not produced any publicly verifiable artifact. Even if the TRON host chain upgrades on schedule, USDD's token-specific governance keys (TDR multisig, admin contracts on Ethereum and BNB Chain) would still require independent migration. This is an operational/product caveat that does not affect current production quantum-readiness but is material for future planning.
- USDD has cross-chain deployments on Ethereum (~$270M) and BNB Chain (~$16M). Each host chain has its own PQC migration timeline. Ethereum's post-quantum roadmap targets Layer 1 upgrades by 2029. BNB Chain has no public PQC roadmap. Cross-chain coordination risk is an operational caveat, not a current deduction.
- The TRON DAO Reserve's governance portal has been decommissioned and DAO voting is no longer functional. All governance is exercised through a 5-of-7 multisig. This centralization means quantum compromise of a small number of keys could be catastrophic, but this is already captured in the quantum-critical vulnerability classification of admin keys.
- USDD's collateral reserves (BTC, TRX, USDT, USDC) are custodied in TDR-controlled multisig wallets. A quantum attack on these wallets could drain the collateral backing USDD, triggering a depeg event. This risk is captured under the admin/governance key vulnerability.
- USDD's cross-chain presence multiplies the attack surface, as a quantum compromise on any of the host chains' admin keys or bridge contracts could affect the token's peg or supply.
Evidence record
Claims and Caveats
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public cryptographic inventory of critical public-key mechanisms and public quantum threat model
Claim: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model exists for USDD.
Coverage basis: Absence confirmed by exhaustive search of USDD official documentation (usdd.io, docs.usdd.io), TRON DAO Reserve publications, and third-party sources.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory. Cap: 10.
Assurance: Exhaustive search of USDD and TRON DAO Reserve publications confirms no quantum-specific inventory, threat model, or risk assessment exists. Evidence confidence is High for the absence claim.
USDD has not published any inventory of its quantum-vulnerable cryptographic mechanisms. The TRON PQC announcement (April 2026) names NIST standards but does not constitute a cryptographic inventory or threat model for USDD specifically.
Security Assessment & Evidence Preparedness
Public evidence record supporting the assessment
Claim: No public evidence record supporting any quantum risk assessment exists for USDD.
Coverage basis: Absence confirmed by search of official sources.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: Confidence is High for the absence of any evidence record. No code references, specs, audits, transaction examples, or reproducible analytics addressing quantum risk have been published by the USDD project.
No quantum-specific evidence record exists.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Spend authorization / transaction signatures are PQC or hybrid-PQC on mainnet
Claim: USDD inherits host-chain ECDSA-only transaction signatures on TRON, Ethereum, and BNB Chain. No PQC or hybrid-PQC protection exists.
Coverage basis: TRON official documentation confirms ECDSA secp256k1 for all account and transaction signatures. USDD is a standard TRC-20 token with no custom signature scheme.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Active production spend authorization remains entirely ECC-only. Cap: 40.
Assurance: TRON protocol documentation is unambiguous: ECDSA secp256k1 is the only signature algorithm. USDD is a standard TRC-20 token with no custom cryptographic dependencies for spend authorization. Ethereum and BNB Chain similarly use ECDSA.
All three host chains use ECDSA secp256k1 (or equivalent) for transaction signatures with no PQC or hybrid path. USDD inherits this vulnerability. The TRON PQC announcement does not change current production status.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Account, address, public-key exposure, and key-derivation design prevents long-exposure quantum-vulnerable ownership paths or supports PQ/hybrid controls
Claim: All host chains expose public keys on-chain for transacted accounts, creating long-exposure quantum-vulnerable ownership paths with no PQ/hybrid controls.
Coverage basis: TRON derives addresses from public keys which are exposed on first transaction. Ethereum EOAs expose public keys on spend. No PQ/hybrid address schemes or key-derivation controls exist.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Material long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value exists with no migration, freeze, or recovery path. Cap: 55.
Assurance: TRON accounts that have sent transactions have their public keys permanently visible on-chain (at-rest exposure). Ethereum EOAs similarly expose public keys. These can be attacked offline with no time constraint by a quantum adversary running Shor's algorithm.
Long-exposure (at-rest) public-key risk applies to all USDD balances held in accounts that have ever sent a transaction. This includes the vast majority of the ~$1.4B circulating supply.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Consensus-critical authentication is PQC or hybrid-PQC where applicable, including validator signatures, VRFs, randomness beacons, threshold signatures, or block certificates
Claim: USDD inherits host-chain consensus authentication. TRON, Ethereum, and BNB Chain all use ECDSA or BLS-based consensus mechanisms with no PQC protection.
Coverage basis: USDD is a token and does not operate its own consensus layer. All host chains have quantum-vulnerable consensus authentication.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: As a token, USDD does not control host-chain consensus. However, compromise of host-chain consensus could rewrite USDD state. All host chains have quantum-vulnerable consensus mechanisms.
Inherited host-chain risk. Consensus compromise on any host chain could affect USDD balances and state on that chain.
Production Cryptographic Protection
State-integrity and data-availability mechanisms are quantum-safe where applicable, including commitments, nullifiers, accumulators, script authorization, supply-binding mechanisms, KZG/pairing-based commitments, and bridge verification
Claim: USDD state integrity depends entirely on host-chain state mechanisms, all of which are classical (ECDSA-based).
Coverage basis: USDD is a standard token with no custom cryptographic commitments, nullifiers, accumulators, or proof systems for state integrity.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: USDD's state (balances, allowances, collateral accounting in the Vat module) is maintained by host-chain state, which relies on classical cryptography. No independent state-integrity mechanisms exist.
Inherited host-chain risk.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Privacy and proof layers are quantum-safe where applicable, including ZK proof assumptions (distinguishing pairing-based systems such as Groth16/PLONK from hash-based systems such as STARKs), note encryption, viewing keys, stealth addresses, and shielded state
Claim: USDD has no privacy or proof layer.
Coverage basis: USDD is a transparent stablecoin with no shielded transactions, ZK proofs, or privacy features.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
N/A. USDD has no privacy architecture.
Production Cryptographic Protection
P2P transport, node identity, and peer authentication are PQC, hybrid-PQC, or satisfied by design
Claim: USDD is a token and does not operate a P2P network layer.
Coverage basis: USDD has no independent P2P transport, node identity, or peer authentication layer.
Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
N/A. Token has no P2P layer.
Production Cryptographic Protection
Critical wallet, custody, HSM, signer, and hardware-wallet workflows support the production PQ/hybrid path or are protected by native satisfied-by-design controls
Claim: No PQ/hybrid wallet, custody, or HSM workflows exist for USDD. The TDR multisig and all admin contracts use classical ECDSA signing exclusively.
Coverage basis: The TRON DAO Reserve 5-of-7 multisig (controlling Issuance, Authorized, and TRX Burning contracts) uses standard TRON ECDSA accounts. No PQ wallet support exists for USDD on any chain.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Token-specific admin/governance keys are entirely ECDSA-based and quantum-vulnerable. Cap: 60.
Assurance: LlamaRisk assessment and USDD official documentation confirm all TDR contracts are controlled by a 5-of-7 ECDSA multisig with no PQ or hybrid signing capability. No hardware wallet, HSM, or custody workflow supporting PQC exists for USDD admin operations.
The TDR multisig keys are the most critical attack surface. Compromise of 5 of 7 keys grants full control over USDD supply and collateral. These keys are permanently exposed (at-rest) on-chain whenever the multisig executes a transaction.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Percentage of economically relevant value-at-risk protected from quantum key-recovery attacks across all attack windows
Claim: 0% of USDD value-at-risk is protected. All ~$1.4B circulating across TRON, Ethereum, and BNB Chain is on quantum-vulnerable host chains with no PQC protection.
Coverage basis: USDD circulating supply data from CoinMarketCap and DefiLlama confirms ~$1.4B total across all chains. No portion is protected by PQC or hybrid cryptography.
Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: Material long-exposure quantum-vulnerable value (~$1.4B) exists with no migration, freeze, or recovery path. Cap: 55.
Assurance: Coverage is <25% (effectively 0%), earning the minimum score of 1 out of 20 subfactor points. The ~$1.4B in circulation is entirely exposed. Chain distribution: TRON ~$1.14B, Ethereum ~$270M, BNB Chain ~$16M.
Score reflects <25% coverage threshold per Section 9.3.1. All circulating USDD is quantum-vulnerable.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Critical wallets migrated, protected, or inherently PQ-native, including treasuries, exchanges, custodians, bridges, foundations, and major protocols
Claim: No critical wallets (treasuries, exchanges, custodians, bridges, foundations, TDR multisig) have migrated to or are protected by PQC.
Coverage basis: The TRON DAO Reserve 5-of-7 multisig, all PSM contracts, and all admin contracts use classical ECDSA. No exchange or custodian has attested to PQ-protected USDD custody.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Quantum blocker: TDR multisig admin keys are quantum-vulnerable. Cap: 60.
Assurance: ChainSecurity audit confirms admin control through DSPauseProxy and GovActionsProxy with fully trusted admin capable of accessing user funds. All admin paths use classical ECDSA.
The TDR multisig, Authorized Contract, Issuance Contract, TRX Burning Contract, and PSM contracts are all quantum-vulnerable. No critical wallet migration has occurred.
Migration Status & Value-at-Risk
Legacy vulnerable pools/accounts/UTXOs/contracts are identified, measurable, deprecated, migrated, frozen, or proven not to exist by design
Claim: No legacy quantum-vulnerable pools or accounts have been identified, measured, or targeted for migration by the USDD project.
Coverage basis: USDD documentation identifies contract addresses but does not classify them by quantum vulnerability, nor has any deprecation, freeze, or migration path been proposed.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: No quantum-vulnerable pool identification, measurement, or migration planning exists. The USDD 2.0 migration is a contract upgrade unrelated to quantum security.
USDD has not acknowledged, let alone addressed, the quantum vulnerability of its legacy contract infrastructure.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Public migration or protection roadmap with sequencing, activation criteria, and dependencies
Claim: No USDD-specific quantum migration roadmap exists. TRON's PQC roadmap announcement (April 2026) does not address USDD token-specific migration.
Coverage basis: TRON's announced PQC roadmap (testnet Q2 2026, mainnet Q3 2026) is a public statement only, lacking formal governance proposal, technical documentation, code, or testnet. It does not address USDD governance key migration or cross-chain coordination.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium
Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: The TRON PQC announcement is a declaration of intent with no formal governance proposal, technical specification, code, or testnet as of June 6, 2026. The promised Q2 2026 testnet has not materialized. Even if TRON upgrades, USDD's Ethereum and BNB Chain deployments and cross-chain bridge infrastructure would require independent migration. Evidence confidence is Medium due to the gap between announcement and verifiable artifacts.
The TRON roadmap announcement does not constitute a USDD migration roadmap. It does not address: (a) USDD governance/admin key migration, (b) cross-chain USDD migration on Ethereum and BNB Chain, (c) bridge security during transition, or (d) TDR multisig migration to PQC.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration accessibility and defaults: PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, and migration prompts are available, default, strongly preferred, mandatory, or complete by design
Claim: No PQ/hybrid account creation, wallet support, transaction paths, custody paths, warnings, or migration prompts exist for USDD on any chain.
Coverage basis: No evidence of any migration tooling or user-facing quantum-security features for USDD across TRON, Ethereum, or BNB Chain.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: Comprehensive absence confirmed. No wallet, exchange, or custody provider offers PQ-protected USDD transactions. No user-facing quantum warnings exist in USDD documentation or interfaces.
Migration accessibility is nonexistent. Users have no path to protect their USDD holdings from quantum attack.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Migration enforcement and coordination: enforcement mechanisms exist (such as deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, unsafe-path blocking, or mandatory migration after a deadline) and exchange, custody, bridge, wallet, and infrastructure coordination prevents unsafe fallback into vulnerable systems
Claim: No migration enforcement mechanisms or ecosystem coordination exists for USDD quantum migration.
Coverage basis: No deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, or mandatory migration mechanisms exist. No exchange or custody coordination for quantum migration has been announced.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: No enforcement or coordination mechanisms exist. The centralized TDR governance model could theoretically enable rapid migration if a plan existed, but none does.
No enforcement or coordination infrastructure exists.
Migration Mechanism, Governance & Ecosystem Coordination
Emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process for quantum-related vulnerabilities
Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process exists for USDD.
Coverage basis: No quantum-specific security contact, disclosure process, or incident-response playbook has been published by the USDD project or TRON DAO Reserve.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: The absence of a formal quantum-specific incident-response process is an assurance-only caveat per Section 8.2. It does not independently reduce the QRI Score but reflects operational immaturity for quantum incidents. Recorded as a note-only caveat because the quantum-critical vulnerabilities (ECDSA-only spend auth, vulnerable admin keys) are already captured by other subfactors.
Per QRI Section 8.2, the absence of a formal quantum-specific incident-response playbook does not create an independent Readiness & Risk Cap. It is recorded as an assurance-only caveat.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Uses NIST-standardized, standards-track, or broadly reviewed PQC/hybrid-PQC algorithms appropriate to the use case
Claim: No PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms are in use for USDD or its host chains in production.
Coverage basis: All production cryptography is classical ECDSA. TRON's PQC announcement names NIST standards (ML-DSA, FN-DSA, SLH-DSA) but no implementation exists.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: TRON has named NIST standards in a public announcement but has not implemented them. No PQC algorithms are in production use for USDD on any chain.
The TRON announcement naming NIST algorithms is a positive signal for future direction but does not constitute current production use.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Independent cryptographic and implementation audit exists for the quantum-critical scope; audit freshness and scope fit are reflected in Confidence
Claim: No independent cryptographic audit of quantum-critical scope exists for USDD. Existing audits (ChainSecurity, SlowMist) cover classical smart-contract security only.
Coverage basis: ChainSecurity audit of USDD V2 covers smart-contract logic (MakerDAO fork), governance contracts, and access control. SlowMist audited TRC-20/ERC-20 tokens and PSM. Neither addresses quantum threat models or PQC implementation.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: Existing audits are scope-mismatched for quantum-critical evaluation. They verify classical smart-contract correctness but do not assess quantum vulnerability of ECDSA dependencies, key management, or migration readiness. This is a note-only caveat because the quantum-critical vulnerability (ECDSA-only) is independently verifiable from protocol documentation without needing a special audit.
Per QRI Section 6.4, scope-mismatched audits support only the audited component. The quantum vulnerability is verifiable from TRON protocol documentation, so the audit gap does not independently reduce the QRI Score.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Open-source, reproducible implementation
Claim: USDD smart contracts are verifiable on-chain (Ethereum, BSC), but no PQC implementation exists to be open-source or reproducible.
Coverage basis: USDD contracts are deployed and verifiable. No PQC code exists.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: Classical smart contracts are open-source/verifiable, but this subfactor evaluates the quantum-critical implementation. Since no PQC implementation exists, score is 0.
No PQC implementation to evaluate for open-source reproducibility.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Parameter agility and future upgrade path are documented
Claim: No parameter agility or quantum upgrade path is documented for USDD.
Coverage basis: USDD proxy contracts (DSProxy) enable code execution on behalf of users and support upgradeability through governance, but no quantum-specific parameter agility or upgrade path is documented.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing
Assurance: USDD's proxy-based upgradeability provides a theoretical mechanism for future quantum migration but no documented plan, parameter agility specification, or cryptographic agility design exists.
The existence of upgradeable proxy contracts does not constitute a documented quantum upgrade path.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Stateful-signature safety, side-channel, fault-injection, state-management, hardware-wallet, HSM, or custody implementation risks are considered, including anti-reuse controls and signing-state discipline for XMSS/LMS-style schemes
Claim: No stateful-signature or side-channel considerations are documented because no PQC signatures are in use.
Coverage basis: No PQC implementation exists to assess for stateful-signature safety or side-channel risks.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable
Assurance: This subfactor is applicable in principle (future PQC implementation would need these considerations) but scores 0 because no PQC implementation exists. The TDR multisig's ECDSA keys have their own classical side-channel and custody risks, but these are not quantum-specific.
No PQC implementation to evaluate.
Algorithm & Implementation Assurance
Performance and resource-impact analysis exists where PQ signature/verification costs could affect safe deployment, block validation, gas/fee markets, mempool policy, archival growth, or validator/node hardware requirements
Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis for PQC deployment exists for USDD or its host chains in production.
Coverage basis: TRON's PQC announcement acknowledges that PQC signatures are ~10x larger than ECDSA, which could affect throughput, but no formal analysis has been published.
Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High
Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only
Assurance: The TRON announcement acknowledges the ~10x signature size increase as a concern but provides no formal performance analysis, benchmark, or resource-impact assessment. This is an assurance-only caveat because it does not independently create a current quantum attack path; the ECDSA-only vulnerability already caps the score.
Per QRI Section 8.2, missing formal performance benchmarks are note-only unless resource constraints prevent safe use of a PQ path. No PQ path exists, so this is an assurance-only caveat.
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