YLDS YLDS

Claim: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model published by Figure Certificate Company, Figure Markets, or any YLDS-affiliated entity.

Coverage basis: Absence of any quantum-specific documentation from the project itself. The Provenance Blockchain whitepaper lists Ed25519 and BLS as current cryptographic primitives but this is a host-chain document, not a YLDS-specific inventory.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No public cryptographic inventory or quantum threat model published by the project

Assurance: The cryptographic mechanisms used by YLDS can be inferred from host-chain documentation (Provenance: Ed25519, BLS; Solana: Ed25519; Ethereum: ECDSA secp256k1; etc.), but the project itself has not catalogued its quantum attack surface.

YLDS is not PQ-native; it launched on classical blockchains. The PQ-Native Rule does not apply. The project must publish its own inventory to receive points here.

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (host chain primitives listed, no YLDS-specific inventory)
• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (no quantum security section)
• https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026008786/figure-blockchain424b4.htm (SEC filing, no quantum disclosure)

Claim: No quantum-specific evidence record (code references, specs, audits, transaction examples, or reproducible analytics) has been published by the project.

Coverage basis: Absence of any project-published quantum assessment artifacts.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Third-party sources (SEC filings, Provenance whitepaper, stableregistry.com) provide sufficient evidence to assess quantum risk externally, but the project has published no quantum-specific evidence record of its own.

This subfactor scores 0 because the project has not published any quantum assessment. External evidence is recorded under other subfactors.

Claim: All host chains use classical ECC-based spend authorization: Provenance (Ed25519), Solana (Ed25519), Ethereum (ECDSA secp256k1), Sui (Ed25519), Avalanche (ECDSA), Stellar (Ed25519). No PQC or hybrid-PQC signatures are supported for YLDS token transfers.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain signature schemes. Host-chain documentation and whitepapers confirm classical ECC primitives only.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All host chains use classical ECC-only spend authorization with no PQC or hybrid-PQC path for YLDS transfers

Assurance: High confidence: host-chain cryptographic primitives are publicly documented (Provenance whitepaper, Solana docs, Ethereum yellow paper, Stellar docs). No evidence of any PQC spend-authorization path for YLDS transfers on any chain.

YLDS inherits spend authorization from each host chain under the Token Inheritance rule (Section 7.2). All host chains remain ECC-only for transaction signatures as of the evaluation date. Provenance's quantum-resistant evolution is roadmap-only (24–36 months).

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (Ed25519, BLS signatures listed as current primitives)
• https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026008786/figure-blockchain424b4.htm (confirms YLDS deployment on Provenance and other chains)
• https://stableregistry.com/stablecoins/ylds/ (confirms deployments on Provenance, Solana, Sui)

Claim: YLDS token accounts on all host chains use classical ECC-based address schemes with long-exposure public-key surfaces. Ethereum EOAs that have sent transactions reveal full secp256k1 public keys; Solana Ed25519 addresses can expose public keys on spend; Provenance accounts use Ed25519 public keys.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain address and key-derivation designs. All host chains use classical ECC address schemes with known long-exposure vulnerabilities.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Long-exposure quantum-vulnerable public keys exist on all host chains with no migration, freeze, or deprecation path for YLDS holders

Assurance: High confidence: the address and key-derivation designs of all host chains are well-documented and universally classical ECC-based. YLDS does not add any PQ key-derivation layer.

Ethereum EOAs that have sent transactions have fully exposed secp256k1 public keys — a long-exposure (at-rest) quantum attack surface. Solana Ed25519 addresses reveal public keys on first spend — a short-exposure surface that becomes long-exposure after transaction confirmation.

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (Ed25519 key scheme)
• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (confirms YLDS accounts use Provenance Blockchain accounts with AML/KYC attributes)

Claim: All host chains use classical consensus mechanisms: Provenance (CometBFT with Ed25519/BLS validator signatures), Solana (Tower BFT with Ed25519), Ethereum (Gaspar with BLS/ECDSA), Sui (Narwhal/Bullshark with Ed25519/BLS), Avalanche (Snowman with ECDSA), Stellar (SCP with Ed25519). No host chain has production PQC consensus.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain consensus security. YLDS token finality depends on host-chain consensus remaining uncompromised.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Consensus on all host chains remains quantum-vulnerable; a compromised consensus layer could reorder or censor YLDS transactions

Assurance: High confidence: all host-chain consensus mechanisms are publicly documented as classical ECC-based. The Provenance whitepaper explicitly lists current cryptographic primitives as Ed25519 and BLS.

While consensus compromise is typically more resource-intensive than individual key recovery, it remains a quantum-critical vulnerability. YLDS inherits this risk from all host chains.

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (CometBFT BFT PoS, Ed25519/BLS, block time 4-5s)
• https://github.com/provenance-io/provenance/releases/tag/v1.28.0-rc2 (current codebase shows no PQC integration)

Claim: YLDS token state (balances, allowances) depends on host-chain state integrity. All host chains use classical cryptographic commitments for state (Merkle trees, etc.). No host chain has quantum-safe state binding in production.

Coverage basis: Token inherits host-chain state integrity. The off-chain transfer-agent ledger provides a secondary legal record but does not make on-chain state quantum-safe.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Medium confidence: host-chain state integrity mechanisms are classical. However, the SEC-registered transfer-agent structure provides an off-chain legal record that is independent of on-chain state integrity. This does not make on-chain state quantum-safe but provides a recovery backstop.

The dual-record structure (on-chain + transfer-agent ledger) is unusual for a blockchain token and provides resilience against on-chain state corruption. However, on-chain quantum attacks that alter token balances could still cause disruption before off-chain correction.

• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (transfer agent maintains official ownership records; blockchain records are secondary)
• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (SHA-256, IPFS-compatible content-addressable storage — classical)

Claim: YLDS is not a privacy token. No shielded pools, ZK proofs, note encryption, viewing keys, or stealth addresses are used in the YLDS protocol.

Coverage basis: No privacy layer exists in the YLDS token design.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: N/A — no privacy layer exists to evaluate.

The Provenance Blockchain whitepaper mentions zk-STARK research for post-quantum security in its Future R&D section, but this is research-stage for the host chain and unrelated to YLDS's current production design which has no privacy features.

• https://www.figuremarkets.com/c/ylds/ (no privacy features described)
• https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026008786/figure-blockchain424b4.htm (transparent on-chain transfers with KYC attributes)

Claim: YLDS is a token, not a blockchain. It does not operate its own P2P network or node infrastructure. P2P transport is entirely inherited from host chains.

Coverage basis: Token has no independent P2P layer. Node identity and peer authentication exist only at the host-chain level.

Implementation score: 1 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: not applicable

Assurance: N/A — token has no P2P layer to evaluate.

Token Inheritance rule (Section 7.2) applies. P2P vulnerabilities on host chains could affect YLDS transaction propagation but this is scored under host-chain consensus and spend-authorization subfactors.

Claim: Figure Markets uses classical MPC (Multi-Party Computation) wallets for self-custody. No evidence of PQC or hybrid-PQC support in wallet, custody, HSM, or signer workflows. Admin keys for YLDS token contracts on non-Provenance chains are of unknown quantum resilience.

Coverage basis: Figure Markets publicly states use of MPC wallets. MPC implementations are classical (ECDSA/Ed25519-based threshold signing) and do not protect against quantum key recovery from public keys.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: MPC wallet infrastructure and admin keys are quantum-vulnerable; no PQC or hybrid-PQC support exists

Assurance: Medium confidence: Figure Markets publicly describes MPC wallet usage but does not disclose specific MPC algorithms. All known production MPC wallet implementations for blockchain use classical ECDSA/Ed25519 threshold schemes. Admin/upgrade key configurations for YLDS contracts on Solana, Ethereum, Sui, and Avalanche are not publicly documented — a significant evidence gap.

The transfer-agent freeze/clawback mechanism provides an out-of-band recovery path that partially mitigates wallet-compromise risk, but does not prevent the initial quantum attack on wallet keys. Solana PDAs are quantum-resistant by design but the signatories controlling them remain vulnerable (Blueshift Research, 2025).

• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (MPC wallet custody described)
• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (MPC self-custody technology confirmed for Crypto Platform users)
• https://blueshift.gg/research/quantum-proofing-solana (Solana PDA multisigs are quantum-resistant but signatories are quantum-vulnerable Ed25519 keypairs — directly relevant to YLDS admin keys on Solana)

Claim: 0% of YLDS value-at-risk is protected by PQC or hybrid-PQC mechanisms. Approximately ~$557M in circulation (as of May 2026) is entirely dependent on classical ECC spend authorization across all host chains.

Coverage basis: No PQC or hybrid-PQC protection exists for YLDS token transfers on any host chain. All value is quantum-vulnerable.

Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: 100% of ~$557M YLDS value-at-risk is quantum-vulnerable with no PQC protection

Assurance: Medium confidence on exact circulation: Figure Technology Solutions reports ~$557M in circulation as of May 2026. The exact figure may vary but the proportion protected (0%) is certain. No PQC protection path exists for any YLDS value.

Scored at <25% coverage per Section 9.3.1 (Implementation Score 0.05 = 1/20 earned points). Even if market-cap data is imprecise, the protected proportion is definitively 0%.

• https://www.aseangazette.com/tmt-newswire/globe-newswire/2026/06/03/figure-technology-solutions-reports-may-2026-operating-data/108001/ (~$557M in circulation as of May 2026)
• https://stableregistry.com/stablecoins/ylds/ (deployed on 3+ chains)
• https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026008786/figure-blockchain424b4.htm (~$21.5M outstanding as of Sep 2025, now much larger)

Claim: No critical YLDS wallets (treasuries, exchange wallets, custodian wallets, bridge contracts, or foundation-controlled addresses) have been migrated to PQC or hybrid-PQC protection. The Figure Certificate Company's administrative control provides a recovery mechanism but not quantum-resistant on-chain protection.

Coverage basis: No evidence of any PQC migration for any YLDS-critical wallet on any host chain.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No critical YLDS wallets have been migrated to quantum-resistant protection

Assurance: Medium confidence: while the SEC-regulated transfer-agent structure provides a strong off-chain recovery path, this is not on-chain migration or protection. The issuer's administrative keys themselves may be quantum-vulnerable if they control on-chain admin functions.

The transfer agent's freeze/clawback capability is a recovery mechanism, not migration or protection. Per Section 10.1, recoverability earns points in preparedness and migration mechanism but not full production-protection credit.

• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (transfer agent maintains ownership records; issuer can freeze/clawback)
• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (MPC wallet custody, no PQ features)

Claim: No quantum-vulnerable YLDS accounts or pools have been identified, measured, deprecated, migrated, or frozen by the project. The project has not published any accounting of quantum-exposed value.

Coverage basis: Absence of any project-published identification or measurement of quantum-vulnerable YLDS holdings.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Medium confidence: the absence of a published inventory means quantum-vulnerable value cannot be measured with precision. However, since 0% is protected, the practical impact on scoring is minimal.

This subfactor requires the project to actively identify and measure its quantum-vulnerable surface. YLDS has not done this. The transfer agent's off-chain records could theoretically support such measurement but have not been used for quantum-risk purposes.

Claim: No YLDS-specific PQ migration or protection roadmap exists. The Provenance Blockchain host chain has a 'Quantum-Resistant Protocol Evolution' item in its 24–36 month roadmap, but this is a host-chain item with no YLDS-specific planning, activation criteria, or dependencies published.

Coverage basis: Absence of YLDS-specific roadmap. Provenance's roadmap is a host-chain document only, listed under 'Long-Term Ecosystem Expansion (24-36 Months)' in the whitepaper.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Low

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No YLDS-specific PQ migration roadmap exists

Assurance: Low confidence on roadmap applicability: the Provenance roadmap mentions PQC generically ('post-quantum cryptographic primitives, quantum-safe signature schemes, lattice-based cryptography integration') with no activation criteria, testnet dates, or YLDS-specific planning. This is a marketing/vision statement, not an actionable migration plan.

Per QRI spec: roadmaps are not production protection. The Provenance roadmap item is at the 'proposal/vision' level (Implementation Score 0.25 equivalent for the host chain). YLDS itself has no roadmap at all (0.00).

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (Section 9.4: 'Quantum-Resistant Protocol Evolution' in 24-36 month horizon)
• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (no PQ roadmap or quantum section)

Claim: No PQ or hybrid-PQC account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist for YLDS on any host chain.

Coverage basis: Complete absence of any PQ migration tooling or user-facing migration support for YLDS.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQ migration accessibility, tooling, or user education exists for YLDS

Assurance: High confidence: Figure Markets' published product documentation shows no quantum-related features, warnings, or migration paths. Users cannot create PQ-protected YLDS accounts or migrate existing holdings.

YLDS is not PQ-native, so the PQ-Native Rule exemption from migration prompts does not apply. The project would need to build or leverage host-chain PQ migration tooling.

• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (no PQ wallet or migration features)
• https://www.figuremarkets.com/c/ylds/ (no quantum safety documentation)

Claim: YLDS has a centralized freeze/clawback mechanism via the transfer agent (Figure Equity Solutions) on Provenance Blockchain. However, this is a recovery mechanism, not a PQ migration enforcement mechanism. No deprecation of classical signing, no restricted withdrawals, and no exchange/custody/bridge coordination for PQ migration exists.

Coverage basis: SEC filings document the transfer agent's authority to revoke AML/KYC attributes and force-transfer tokens. This enables post-attack recovery but does not enforce migration or prevent quantum-vulnerable transactions.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQ migration enforcement mechanisms exist; freeze/clawback is recovery-only, not migration

Assurance: Medium confidence on cross-chain enforceability: the freeze/clawback mechanism is documented for Provenance Blockchain. It is unclear whether equivalent controls exist or are enforceable on Solana, Ethereum, Sui, Avalanche, or Stellar deployments.

The freeze/clawback capability is a significant PQ-Recoverable feature (see Section 10.1) but does not constitute migration enforcement. It enables post-attack correction, not pre-attack prevention. Cross-chain recovery coordination is unverified.

• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (freeze via AML/KYC revocation, clawback via forced-transfer feature described in detail)
• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-memo-figure-markets-holdings-inc-figure-certificate-co-allen-overy-shearman-sterling-llp-practus.pdf (same controls confirmed)

Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process has been published by Figure Certificate Company or Figure Markets. The SEC-regulated structure and transfer-agent controls provide a governance framework but no quantum-specific playbook.

Coverage basis: Absence of quantum-specific incident-response documentation. The SEC filings describe general operational controls (freeze, clawback) but do not address quantum-attack scenarios.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Low

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No quantum-specific incident-response process exists

Assurance: Low confidence: while the SEC-regulated structure implies governance maturity, the absence of any quantum-specific process means response to a quantum attack would be ad hoc. The freeze/clawback tools exist but no playbook documents their coordinated use across six chains in a quantum emergency.

Per Section 7.4 (Note-Only Caveat Rule): the absence of a formal quantum-specific IR playbook does not independently create a Readiness & Risk Cap, but it does reduce the Implementation Score for this subfactor. The transfer-agent structure provides a partial foundation but is not a documented quantum IR process.

• https://www.sec.gov/files/ctf-input-figure-markets-040825.pdf (operational controls described, no quantum scenario)
• https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2064124/000162828026008786/figure-blockchain424b4.htm (risk factors section, no quantum risk disclosure)

Claim: No PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms are used in the YLDS protocol, wallet infrastructure, or admin key management. All cryptography is classical ECC (Ed25519, ECDSA).

Coverage basis: No PQC algorithms are deployed or planned in any YLDS-specific context.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQC algorithms are used in any YLDS-critical context

Assurance: High confidence: all documented cryptography is classical. The Provenance whitepaper's future PQC references are research/roadmap only.

The Provenance whitepaper mentions 'lattice-based cryptography integration' as a long-term goal but this is not implemented, standardized for the use case, or integrated with YLDS.

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (Ed25519, BLS only — no PQC)
• https://www.figuremarkets.com/ (no PQC claims)

Claim: No independent cryptographic or implementation audit exists for quantum-critical properties of YLDS or its host-chain deployments. KPMG provides financial reserve audits only.

Coverage basis: No quantum-specific audit has been conducted or published.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The absence of a quantum-specific audit is noted but does not independently reduce the QRI Score further (score is already at minimum due to complete absence of PQ implementation). Audit absence is recorded for confidence and assurance purposes.

Per Section 6.4: absent audit where no quantum-critical implementation exists is scored at 0.00 implementation but does not create an additional Readiness & Risk Cap beyond those already applied.

• https://www.ylds.com/ (lists KPMG as auditor — financial only)
• https://stableregistry.com/stablecoins/ylds/ (no cryptographic audit recorded)

Claim: No PQC implementation exists to be open-source or reproducible. YLDS token contracts on various chains may be partially verifiable but contain no quantum-resistant code.

Coverage basis: No PQC code exists in the YLDS ecosystem.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: none · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: The subfactor is applicable (it measures whether the quantum-critical implementation is open-source). Since no PQ implementation exists, it scores 0.00. Even the classical token contracts lack full public verification on some chains.

This subfactor would become relevant if/when YLDS deploys PQC code. Currently there is nothing to evaluate.

• https://stableregistry.com/stablecoins/ylds/ (contract verification status: addresses pending verification)

Claim: No parameter agility or future PQ upgrade path has been documented for YLDS. The Provenance Blockchain roadmap mentions future PQC integration generically but without YLDS-specific parameters, migration paths, or upgrade procedures.

Coverage basis: No YLDS-specific cryptographic agility documentation exists.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Low

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: Low confidence: the Provenance roadmap mentions PQC at the vision level but provides no parameter specifications, upgrade procedures, backward-compatibility plans, or YLDS-specific integration paths.

Parameter agility documentation is important for a future migration but currently absent. This is scored at 0.00 because no documentation exists.

• https://provenance.io/Provenance-Blockchain-Whitepaper.pdf (PQC mentioned in long-term roadmap only, no parameter details)

Claim: No PQC signatures are in use, so stateful-signature safety (e.g., XMSS/LMS anti-reuse controls) is not currently applicable. No analysis of PQC side-channel or fault-injection risks has been published for any YLDS context.

Coverage basis: No PQC implementation exists to analyze for these risks.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: This subfactor is applicable (it measures whether these risks have been considered for the PQ path). Since no PQ path exists, it scores 0.00. Noted for future evaluation when/if PQC is deployed.

Would become relevant if YLDS or its host chains adopt stateful hash-based signatures (XMSS/LMS). Currently no such plans exist.

Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis exists for PQ signature/verification in any YLDS context. Host-chain PQ migration performance analysis is not YLDS-specific.

Coverage basis: No PQC performance analysis has been published for YLDS.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: score-reducing

Assurance: This subfactor is applicable. No performance analysis exists. Per Section 7.4, the absence of a formal performance benchmark does not independently reduce the QRI Score when no PQ implementation exists — it is scored at 0.00 as part of the implementation gap and noted for future reference.

PQ signature sizes (e.g., Falcon-512: ~666 bytes, ML-DSA: ~2,420 bytes) could impact transaction costs and block space on chains like Solana and Ethereum. This analysis would be important before any YLDS PQ migration.