Pi Network PI

Claim: Pi Network's MiCA whitepaper (November 2025) acknowledges quantum computing as a technological risk that could break encryption paradigms and lead to theft or loss of crypto-assets.

Coverage basis: Official regulatory filing acknowledges quantum threat but does not catalog specific public-key mechanisms, attack surfaces, or affected layers.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No formal public cryptographic inventory published by Pi Core Team

Assurance: Acknowledgment exists but is generic; no enumeration of Ed25519 usage, key exposure surfaces, consensus dependency, or ZK/pairing vulnerability.

Third-party sources (CoinPaprika, OKX, BSC News) have identified Ed25519 as the signature scheme. The project itself has not published a formal inventory.

• MiCA Whitepaper (Pi).docx — official Pi Network regulatory filing, November 2025

Claim: Multiple secondary sources confirm Ed25519 usage and SCP inheritance. Pi blockchain explorer (forked from Stellar explorer) and SDK (using Stellar SDK) confirm Stellar heritage.

Coverage basis: Third-party technical analyses, official SDK documentation, and blockchain explorer code confirm the cryptographic architecture.

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: No official code references, specs, or reproducible analytics published by Pi Core Team. Evidence relies on third-party analysis and SDK documentation rather than formal project disclosure.

The core consensus node implementation is not publicly available. The pi-apps GitHub organization publishes SDKs, explorer, and platform docs but not the consensus client.

• https://github.com/pi-apps/pi-explorer — forked from chatch/stellarexplorer (Stellar)
• https://github.com/pi-apps/pi-sdk-integration-guide — uses Stellar SDK for transaction building and signing
• https://coinpaprika.com/coin/piai-pi-network-ai/ — confirms Ed25519 usage
• https://www.okx.com/learn/is-pi-network-legit — confirms modified SCP consensus
• https://bsc.news/post/pi-network-consensus-mechanism — detailed SCP analysis

Claim: Pi Network uses Ed25519 for transaction signatures, inherited from Stellar Consensus Protocol.

Coverage basis: Multiple sources confirm Ed25519: CoinPaprika analysis, KOSASIH/pi-supernode README explicitly lists 'Ed25519 Signatures' as a security feature, SCP specification mandates Ed25519.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All spend authorization is Ed25519-only; fully vulnerable to Shor's algorithm

Assurance: Ed25519 is well-studied and standardized (RFC 8032). Its quantum vulnerability to Shor's algorithm is well-established in cryptographic literature.

No PQC, hybrid, or quantum-safe alternative exists for any transaction path. Pi addresses start with 'G' (Stellar-style), confirming Ed25519 public key derivation.

• https://coinpaprika.com/coin/piai-pi-network-ai/
• https://github.com/KOSASIH/pi-supernode — README lists 'Ed25519 Signatures'
• https://minepi.com/white-paper/ — confirms SCP adaptation
• https://bsc.news/post/pi-network-consensus-mechanism — confirms SCP/FBA consensus with cryptographic signatures

Claim: Pi Network uses Stellar-style accounts with Ed25519 public keys. Addresses are public and start with 'G'.

Coverage basis: Pi blockchain explorer documentation confirms addresses start with 'G'. Stellar SDK usage confirms Ed25519 key derivation.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Public keys are long-exposed on-chain; all addresses with transaction history have known/derivable Ed25519 public keys vulnerable to offline quantum attack

Assurance: Long-exposure attack window applies: any address that has sent a transaction has a publicly visible Ed25519 public key that can be attacked offline with no time constraint.

No address format supports PQC key types. No key-derivation path exists for hybrid or PQC keys.

• https://pinetwork.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/WIKI/pages/933822465/Pi+Block+Explorer — confirms addresses start with 'G'
• https://github.com/pi-apps/pi-sdk-integration-guide — uses Stellar SDK Keypair.fromSecret()

Claim: SCP consensus messages (nomination, balloting, externalize) are authenticated with Ed25519 signatures, as specified by the Stellar Consensus Protocol.

Coverage basis: SCP specification and all SCP implementations mandate cryptographic signatures for consensus messages. Pi Network inherits this from Stellar.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: SCP consensus messages signed with Ed25519; forged consensus messages could disrupt finality or enable double-spend attacks

Assurance: SCP's safety depends on quorum intersection and cryptographic message integrity. Quantum-forged signatures could undermine both nomination and balloting phases.

Pi's adaptation of SCP with security circles and trust graphs does not alter the underlying cryptographic dependency on Ed25519 for message authentication.

• https://bsc.news/post/pi-network-consensus-mechanism — 'All messages are signed with cryptographic keys'
• https://minepi.com/white-paper/ — confirms SCP/FBA consensus
• https://stellar.org/learn/stellar-consensus-protocol

Claim: Pi Network uses Stellar-derived ledger structure with Ed25519-signed transactions. Protocol v25 introduced X-Ray with BN254 pairing support for ZK-proofs.

Coverage basis: Protocol v25 upgrade announcement confirms BN254 (alt_bn128) pairing support for ZK-proof verification. Base ledger integrity relies on Ed25519 signatures.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: BN254 pairings are quantum-vulnerable; ZK-proofs relying on BN254 can be forged by a CRQC, compromising state integrity for any ZK-based applications

Assurance: BN254 provides ~100-110 bits of classical security. It is not post-quantum secure. Shor's algorithm breaks the discrete log problem underlying pairing-based cryptography.

Protocol v25 is a recent upgrade (January 2026) that introduces new quantum-vulnerable cryptographic surfaces rather than mitigating existing ones.

• https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/pi-networks-long-awaited-stellar-protocol-v25-is-now-live-on-the-mainnet/ — confirms BN254 pairing and X-Ray ZK support
• https://coinfomania.com/pi-network-launches-wordpi-beta-as-v25-protocol-upgrade-goes-live/ — confirms Protocol v25 mainnet activation

Claim: Protocol v25 X-Ray supports zero-knowledge proofs using BN254 pairings and Poseidon hash functions for ZK applications.

Coverage basis: Protocol v25 upgrade documentation and community technical analyses confirm X-Ray privacy protocol with BN254 and Poseidon.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: BN254-based ZK-proof systems are quantum-vulnerable; Poseidon is a hash function and may offer some post-quantum properties, but the pairing dependency dominates

Assurance: Poseidon is a ZK-optimized hash function. While hash functions have some post-quantum resistance, the overall proof system security depends on BN254 pairings which are not post-quantum.

X-Ray is described as enabling 'smooth migration for existing Zero-Knowledge Proof applications' — this implies compatibility with Ethereum's BN254 precompiles, not quantum safety.

• https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/pi-networks-long-awaited-stellar-protocol-v25-is-now-live-on-the-mainnet/
• https://coinfomania.com/pi-network-launches-wordpi-beta-as-v25-protocol-upgrade-goes-live/

Claim: Pi Network nodes communicate over ports 31400-31409. Node identity in SCP is tied to Ed25519 keypairs used for consensus message signing.

Coverage basis: SCP architecture binds P2P node identity to the same Ed25519 keys used for consensus. Pi Node documentation confirms port usage.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Node identity is Ed25519-based and consensus-critical in SCP; quantum-forged node identities could compromise quorum formation

Assurance: In SCP/FBA, node identity is integral to quorum slice configuration. A quantum attacker could impersonate trusted nodes and manipulate quorum formation.

P2P transport encryption may use TLS or similar; if ephemeral Diffie-Hellman is used for transport, it shares the same ECC vulnerability.

• https://github.com/KOSASIH/pi-supernode — documents P2P ports 31400-31409 and Ed25519 node keys
• https://bsc.news/post/pi-network-consensus-mechanism — describes node identity in SCP

Claim: Pi Network provides mobile and desktop wallets using Ed25519 keypairs. Pi SDK uses Stellar SDK Keypair for signing. No PQC wallet support exists.

Coverage basis: Pi SDK documentation and wallet guides confirm Stellar SDK usage. No evidence of PQC wallet support in any official or third-party Pi wallet.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: All wallet and custody workflows are Ed25519-only; no PQC key generation, signing, or verification path exists

Assurance: The Coixa Wallet audit (96/100) assesses wallet application security, not quantum resistance. No HSM or hardware-wallet integration for PQC is documented.

Kraken listing (announced Pi Day 2026) and OKX/Gate.io support mean exchange custody of PI relies on the same Ed25519 infrastructure.

• https://github.com/pi-apps/pi-sdk-integration-guide — uses StellarSdk.Keypair.fromSecret()
• https://simpleswap.io/blog/pi-wallets-a-complete-guide
• https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.blockchainvault&hl=en_US — Pi Browser wallet

Claim: 0% of PI value-at-risk is protected from quantum key-recovery attacks. All ~$1.79B market cap and >10B migrated PI is secured by Ed25519 only.

Coverage basis: All production cryptography is Ed25519-based. No PQC migration has occurred. Coverage is effectively 0%.

Implementation score: 0.05 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: 0% value-at-risk protection; all value is quantum-vulnerable

Assurance: Exact value-at-risk distribution by attack window (long-exposure vs short-exposure) cannot be precisely measured without on-chain analytics, but all migrated PI has publicly visible transaction history and therefore exposed public keys.

Coverage scored at <25% tier (1/20 = 0.05 Implementation Score).

• https://skynet.certik.com/projects/pinetwork — market cap ~$1.79B
• https://crypto.news/pi-network-price-rises-ahead-of-consensus-2026/ — >10B PI migrated, 421K nodes

Claim: No critical wallets (treasuries, exchanges, bridges, foundations, major protocols) are known to be protected by PQC or hybrid signatures.

Coverage basis: All known exchange listings (OKX, Gate.io, Kraken) and Pi ecosystem wallets use standard Ed25519. No PQC-protected custody path is documented.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No critical wallets are quantum-protected

Assurance: The Pi Core Team reportedly controls a large fraction of total supply through foundation wallets; these are quantum-vulnerable.

• https://minepi.com/blog/pi-day-2026/ — Kraken listing announcement with no PQC mention
• https://www.okx.com/learn/is-pi-network-legit

Claim: No legacy vulnerable pools have been formally identified, measured, or targeted for deprecation, freeze, or migration by the Pi Core Team.

Coverage basis: No evidence of any quantum-specific deprecation or migration program. All accounts are Ed25519-based and treated as current.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No legacy vulnerability identification or deprecation program exists

Assurance: KYC-based account system could theoretically enable targeted migration, but no such program has been announced.

The Pi Network's enclosed-to-open mainnet migration focused on KYC verification and balance migration, not cryptographic migration.

Claim: No quantum-specific migration or protection roadmap exists. The official roadmap and Pi Day 2026 announcements focus on protocol upgrades (v20-v23), smart contracts, and ecosystem growth with zero mention of quantum resistance.

Coverage basis: Official roadmap (minepi.com/roadmap) and Pi Day 2026 blog post contain no quantum-related content.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No quantum migration roadmap exists

The Pi Day 2026 blog discusses Node v20.2, Protocol 20, smart contracts, second migrations, Kraken listing, and App Studio — all classical infrastructure. No quantum security mention.

• https://minepi.com/roadmap/
• https://minepi.com/blog/pi-day-2026/

Claim: No PQC or hybrid account creation, wallet tooling, transaction paths, custody paths, user-facing warnings, education, or migration prompts exist.

Coverage basis: All user-facing infrastructure is Ed25519-only. No PQC option is available or planned in any official capacity.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQC account creation or migration tooling exists

Claim: No enforcement mechanisms exist for quantum migration. No deprecation, freeze, disabled legacy signing, restricted withdrawals, or mandatory migration deadlines are documented.

Coverage basis: Protocol governance exists for general upgrades (voting demonstrated for Protocol v25 with 15.8M participants) but no quantum-specific enforcement mechanisms.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No quantum migration enforcement mechanisms exist

Assurance: PiBridge (third-party) enables two-way wrapped PI flow to BSC with no quantum-related restrictions.

The existence of governance voting infrastructure is a positive signal for future migration coordination, but it has not been applied to any quantum-security context.

• https://coinfomania.com/pi-network-launches-wordpi-beta-as-v25-protocol-upgrade-goes-live/ — 15.8M governance vote participants

Claim: No quantum-specific emergency disclosure, incident-response, or governance process is documented.

Coverage basis: No evidence found in any official or secondary source.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: None

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: This is classified as note-only because the absence of a documented quantum-specific IR process does not independently create a quantum-vulnerable path — but it means the project lacks documented preparedness for quantum emergency scenarios.

Claim: Pi Network does not use any PQC or hybrid-PQC algorithms. All production cryptography is classical Ed25519.

Coverage basis: No PQC algorithms are used in any production, testnet, or prototyped capacity by the official Pi Core Team.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: quantum-critical vulnerability · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: No PQC algorithms used in any capacity

Assurance: The unofficial KOSASIH/pi-supernode claims Kyber/Dilithium integration but has no official standing.

Claim: No independent cryptographic audit of the core protocol or signature implementation exists.

Coverage basis: CertiK Skynet confirms 'Not Audited By CertiK' and '3rd Party Audit: No'. No audit from Trail of Bits, NCC Group, Least Authority, or any other cryptographic audit firm is documented.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: High

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Classified as note-only because an audit is not required for the quantum-vulnerability assessment to be conclusive — the vulnerability of Ed25519 to Shor's algorithm is a fundamental mathematical property, not an implementation uncertainty.

Coixa Wallet audit (96/100) is a wallet application audit, not a cryptographic protocol audit.

• https://skynet.certik.com/projects/pinetwork — 'Not Audited By CertiK', 'CertiK Audit: No', '3rd Party Audit: No'

Claim: Pi Network publishes SDKs, explorer, and platform documentation on GitHub (pi-apps organization). The core consensus node implementation is not fully open-source.

Coverage basis: pi-apps GitHub has SDK, explorer, and docs. The consensus client source is not publicly available. The pidiscovery/pi repo (last updated 2020) is a BitShares derivative, not the current Stellar-based Pi Network.

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: quantum-critical uncertainty · Score treatment: score-reducing

Quantum blocker: Core consensus implementation is not open-source, preventing independent verification of cryptographic primitives

Assurance: Partial credit for open-source SDK, explorer, and platform components. The Smart Contract code was open-sourced on GitHub in April 2026 per MEXC reporting.

Without the consensus client source, the exact Ed25519 implementation details (library, parameters, potential modifications) cannot be independently verified.

• https://github.com/pi-apps
• https://github.com/pidiscovery/pi — outdated, BitShares-derived, not current Pi Network

Claim: Pi Network has demonstrated protocol upgrade capability through sequential version upgrades (v19→v20→v21→v22→v23→v25) with governance voting. No quantum-specific upgrade path is documented.

Coverage basis: Protocol upgrade history demonstrates versioning capability. Node software supports automated updates (Windows) and manual updates (Linux CLI).

Implementation score: 0.25 · Evidence confidence: Medium

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Protocol upgrade infrastructure exists but has never been used for cryptographic migration. The Stellar heritage means signature scheme changes would require a fork of the SCP implementation.

Partial credit for demonstrated upgrade capability. The governance voting mechanism (15.8M participants for Protocol v25) provides a coordination framework that could theoretically support future cryptographic migration.

• https://minepi.com/blog/pi-day-2026/ — protocol upgrade history
• https://coinpedia.org/news/smart-contracts-tokens-and-a-may-deadline-pi-networks-2026-roadmap-is-here/ — v23 upgrade timeline

Claim: No PQC stateful-signature schemes (XMSS/LMS) are used, so state-management risks are not applicable to the current implementation. No side-channel or fault-injection analysis of the Ed25519 implementation is publicly documented.

Coverage basis: No PQC implementation exists. No side-channel analysis of the Ed25519 signing implementation is publicly available.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: None

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Classified as note-only because this subfactor primarily addresses PQC-specific risks (stateful signatures, novel side-channel vectors). For the current classical Ed25519 implementation, standard side-channel considerations apply but are not quantum-specific.

Would become relevant if XMSS/LMS or other stateful hash-based signatures were adopted for migration.

Claim: No performance or resource-impact analysis exists for any potential PQC migration path.

Coverage basis: No evidence of any PQC performance benchmarking, block-size impact analysis, gas/fee modeling, or node hardware requirement assessment.

Implementation score: 0 · Evidence confidence: None

Issue classification: assurance-only caveat · Score treatment: note-only

Assurance: Classified as note-only because the absence of a PQC performance analysis does not independently create a quantum-vulnerable path in the current production system.

Pi Network's mobile-first architecture and goal of supporting lightweight nodes would make PQC signature sizes (e.g., Dilithium at ~2.4KB, SPHINCS+ at ~8-49KB) a significant engineering concern requiring analysis before any migration.